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THE NEW REPUBLIC

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Keyserling's Case

★ At first glance at a Washington cocktail party, rotund, benevolent-looking Leon Keyserling, standing with his pretty wife Mary, might bring to mind Mr. Pickwick; but hardly any comparison could be more deceptive. Economist Keyserling is, it is true, a humanitarian, but instead of Pickwick's foggy ameliorism, his IBM-mind is packed with BLS statistics; under a deceptively bland mask he fumes at what he regards as the economic errors of his country. A former top Truman economic adviser, now much consulted by trade union groups, Mr. Keyserling runs a non-profit, non-partisan organization, the Conference on Economic Progress.

If our inadequate analysis is correct, the Keyserling thesis goes something like this: maldistribution of American income gives the public too few dollars to buy the goods the factories can produce; result – one recession follows another, with a sickening cycle of Partial Upturn, Stagnation and Recession.

Leon Keyserling has one great weakness; he congenitally overestimates the economic IQ of the audience he passionately seeks to proselytize. Standing before a rack of charts with a ruler at some Congressional hearing he puts on a dazzling performance, but he often seems to stun rather than convince the cowed legislators. This is unfortunate, because if he is right the country is wrong.

Last week the Congressional Joint Economic Committee released the Keyserling review of the Kennedy tax plan, 40 pages long, with 33 charts. The impressive document struck some observers as the most devastating critique of its kind since Keynes wrote his prophetic *Economic Consequences of the Peace* in 1919. The President, Keyserling says, is sending out a "pygmy" to do a "giant's work." Two-fifths of the people of the richest country on earth, he argues, are living in "poverty and deprivation" (by US standards). To cure the mess we are in, he says, will take all-out measures. He doesn't object to tax cuts, favors them on the whole if they go to low-income groups; but he asks in polite wonder how tax cuts are going to help the 4 million idle who don't *pay* taxes; or why tax cuts to rich individuals and big corporations are likely to bring investments in new factories when the factories already built run part time for lack of demand?

Deficits? – red ink? – tut! says Keyserling impatiently; the country is losing $80-$90 billions annually from a stalled economy; he calmly proposes a one-year Federal stimulus of $10 billion additional spending on top of the $8 billion deficit currently probable.

Such views are apt to be laughed at as wild and hare-brained; and they are in Washington, much as people laughed at Keynes after Versailles. It might be wise, however, not to laugh too hard. The sober Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal observed last month: "The most important problem in the world today is how to get America out of relative economic stagnation" (*NR*, January 26). Deeper unemployment . . . another recession: these would not be laughable to Mr. Kennedy, let alone the country at large.

Economic Forecaster

★ What are Keyserling's claims to consideration? He was assistant to the late great NY Senator, Robert Wagner; he won a $10,000 economic prize in 1944. He started with the Council of Economic Advisers as vice chairman when it began in 1946 and was chairman from 1950 to the end of the Truman Administration. With Eisenhower, Keyserling began making public predictions, mostly lugubrious, and with Ike's help he achieved an impressive batting average. He did this when rosy predictions of others were a dime a dozen.

Eisenhower foresaw boom and rapid growth in 1954, but Keyserling in July of that year, in his pamphlet, *Toward Full Employment*, warned of the stagnation cycle and forecast annual growth of perhaps only 2.5 percent from 1953 to 1960. (Actual growth rate: exactly 2.5 percent; a dismal record for a great nation!)

Among hopeful forecasts from others, the *NYTimes*, July 24, 1960, quoted Keyserling as seeing recession. (It showed up punctually a few months later.)

Early in 1961 Mr. Kennedy brought out his long-awaited economic program. Some hailed it ecstatically, Keyserling in his *Jobs & Growth*, argued that, even if adopted in full, it might leave around 4 3/4 million unemployed at the end of 1962 with unsatisfactory national growth.

(The growth rate was a disappointing 3.6 percent. Full-time unemployment at the end of the year was around 4 1/4 million, and has now risen to almost 6 percent.)

Less Than Gratifying

★ The White House was still making rosy forecasts at the start of 1962. Keyserling in a new pamphlet, *Poverty & Deprivation in the US*, last April discerned the familiar stagnation-cycle with a slowdown ahead and little chance that unemployment would fall to 4 percent by mid-1963 as the Administration hoped. Mr. Kennedy's current expansionary program shows how his expectations have faded. The gloomy prophet was right again.

And now Keyserling turns his attention to the Kennedy tax program itself. Staunch Democrat, strong liberal, Kennedy-sympathizer as he is, he shakes his head sadly; it won't do. Mr. Kennedy in his economic report says the country has had a "gratifying recovery"; Keyserling calls it "the least satisfactory since World War II." The stocky economist likes Kennedy, it appears, but he would go to the stake – a roly-poly Savonarola – rather than abandon his principles.

Indeed, Mr. Kennedy may find that a middle-of-the-road course won't work in a two-lane expressway. Compromise and moderation are misplaced if the need requires something more radical. So far, at any rate, Mr. Kennedy is assailed by *all* sides; Congress is apt to give him just enough tax cut to swell the deficit; not enough to produce prosperity.

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Cut-Up Tax Cut

Until they saw what was in it, organized labor, business groups and most economists seemed ready to buy a tax package put together by the President. Now that they have had time to examine the contents, they have decided it is not what they want at all. The director of research of the Committee for Economic Development says the proposed cuts are too little and too late; the NAM takes exception to what it calls overemphasis on personal income tax relief to low-income groups, arguing that what is needed is more stimulation of investment through larger cuts in corporate taxes; Walter Reuther insists that consumer demand be given greater priority by cutting wage-earner's tax payments. And of course many demand that tax cuts be accompanied by reductions in federal spending because, as Walter Lippmann remarked, "A good majority of our people regard a planned deficit as contrary to sound government and good morals."

Some of this criticism is sound, some not. The most intelligent comments have come in testimony of economists before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. For instance, Gerhard Colm of the National Planning Association has argued that the cut should come sooner than now planned, and that increased federal expenditures should complement the cut, either now or in the near future. TRB in this issue reports on the testimony of Leon Keyserling, whose central objection to the program is that it would contribute little to closing the gap between what the country is producing and what it could produce at full employment. Mr. Keyserling also believes that the tax cut the President wants, without reforms, would allocate over 50 percent of the gains to savings and investment, with less than half going to the consumption side of the economy. His reasoning here is that corporations and persons with high incomes would save, not spend, too many of the dollars they receive through tax reduction. This, Mr. Keyserling says, would further aggravate our ills, since what ails the economy is too little consumption.

That there would be objections to any substantial change in the tax structure or tax levels was certainly foreseen by the White House. So clearly foreseen that the President over-compensated. He pulled back when he should have gone forward. He opted for a hodgepodge of concessions to every conceivable power group, with the result that the fundamental economic justification for a large and prompt tax cut was obscured from the start.

The Administration further weakened its position by deciding to

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tie tax reduction so tightly to tax reform. The Secretary of the Treasury went so far as to suggest to the House Ways and Means Committee that he might have to recommend Presidential veto of the tax bill if it contained no reforms. At the same time, however, Mr. Dillon admitted that most of the contemplated reforms would have little effect on economic growth, and were intended mainly to do away with special tax favors. He also acknowledged that reforms tied to a tax cut would require much longer consideration by Congress than would a tax cut alone; and yet he insisted on the immediate need for the cut. His handling of this built-in contradiction could not help but confuse. For instance, one of the most prominent of the proposed reforms, involving about $2.3 billion out of the total $3.5 billion increased revenue that is anticipated, is the provision that tax deductions for items such as charitable contributions would be allowed only for amounts in excess of five percent of one's income. The best argument Mr. Dillon could muster for this controversial five percent floor for itemized deductions was that it was designed to bring back some revenue the government would lose through the cut. Does he want people to have more money to spend or doesn't he?

The *coup-de-grace*, however, was reserved for the President himself. He had initially, and wisely, based his tax policy on the need for a long-run rise in the growth rate, not on any short run considerations. In the Economic Report this January, he had said, "The outlook for continued moderate expansion in 1963 is now favorable." Today the President says that a cut is essential "to prevent a recession this year and the years to come." But if his tax program is intended to prevent an imminent recession, how can he justify postponing most of the cuts until 1964 and 1965?

Having boxed himself in, the President must box his way out. He will either have to give up most of the reforms at once, or recommend legislative consideration of reforms as a separate item. This could be done by requesting a $10 billion tax cut (the present request is for $13.5 billion), and in a separate bill tying the reform involving $3.5 billion in revenues to a further tax cut of $3.5 billion. The urgency of the tax cut could be further emphasized by speeding up the time-table, phasing the cut over a period of 18 months, or even better, putting most of it in the 12 months beginning this July, rather than over three years as now envisaged.

Church-Related Schools

In his February 16 Washington Report, TRB argued that state aid to church schools would be unconstitutional. The editors have for some time disagreed, and it is perhaps useful to repeat the reasons why.

Those who attend church schools already receive various forms of public aid: free school lunches, transportation, science and foreign language laboratories. Perhaps most important, church schools are given tax exemptions both on property they own and on contributions they receive. Strict constructionists feel that such concessions are contrary to the First Amendment – that in some sense they contribute to "an establishment of religion." But where does this severe view lead? Are we to say, for example, that stationing traffic policemen outside parochial schools in the morning is unconstitutional because it indirectly contributes to the appeal of the school? Or that a town cannot allow cars to park on streets near churches on Sunday since this frees the church from constructing a parking lot and leaves more money for proselytizing? Once one is committed to opposing indirect subsidies there is no end of things to abolish.

A more serviceable approach is that the state should legislate for purely secular ends, but that it should not worry if this incidentally helps a church.

What does this mean when applied to education? The state has an interest in ensuring that all pupils, whether publicly or privately educated, have a mastery of certain subjects, from the three R's to history and chemistry. The state can and should pursue this interest by subsidizing instruction in these subjects. So long as the student is mastering them it makes no difference to the state whether his instructors are Jesuits or agnostics, whether his classroom is owned by the Lutherans or the local school board.

"But," the strict-constructionists argue, "there are no secular subjects in church schools. Every subject, from physics to literature, has a religious significance." That is true, in varying degrees. It is also true that there is a personal element (some call it "bias") in all teaching. Interpretation and belief are intrinsic to any instruction. To some extent, all teaching is "slanted." Whether this is good or bad in the case of any given school or teacher depends on one's private preferences.

We cannot emphasize too strongly, however, that the case for public support of private schools depends upon public control over those activities it supports. Negatively, the state cannot and should not subsidize religious worship. Positively, if the public pays for a physics lab, then the public must have the right to say how that lab is used – what the textbooks say, what the teacher's credentials are, and so forth. If the public provides low interest loans to reduce the cost of constructing a history classroom, then the public, not the churches, must determine what version of history the pupils shall be taught. In practice, such control would probably be very loose – just as state control over what local school boards teach is often very loose. What matters is not that every last concession to religious feeling be re-

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moved from every syllabus, but that the recipients of public aid accept the public's right to say how it is to be used. Churches which are unwilling to accept this principle, believing that their independence would be greviously compromised, would in effect be saying that there are no educational standards which can be agreed to by all; that no public interference with subject matter can be tolerated; that true education must be "Catholic education" or "Jewish education" or "Lutheran education." Schools which feel this way may be right, but they have no claim on the public purse.

A final point. Some who object to any further aid to church-related schools do so less for reasons of legality than because they believe the public school system is a unifying force in a pluralistic society, and that nothing should be done which weakens that system. But would the public schools be hurt if more children were in Catholic or Anglican or Lutheran schools? Wouldn't smaller enrollments be better for the public schools? Likewise, would it hurt the public schools if the present state-church impasse were resolved so that more federal money became available to both systems?

The national interest is in better education for *all* children, regardless of race, creed, or parental income. Nobody needs to send his child to a private school; but millions do. No useful purpose is served if these children grow up knowing less history or less chemistry than children who attend public school. Ignorance, not the Catholic hierarchy, is the enemy.

Justice in Virginia

In Lynchburg, Virginia, on a rainy December day an unmarried white woman, aged 59, was raped and robbed of $1.36 by a Negro. She was the third woman in two months to have been sexually assaulted, and from her descriptions, the Lynchburg papers pieced together and published a sketch of the "Negro Rapist."

Two days later Thomas Carlton Wansley, 17, a Negro, was arrested and accused of the rape of two women, the attempted rape of the third, and of robbery. Though he was a minor, the city authorities exercised their option and tried him as an adult. In two different trials, a male, all-white jury found him guilty of the two rapes and of robbery. The judge sentenced the boy to die in the electric chair – not once but twice –and as an afterthought, gave him 20 years in prison. The day of the conviction, the Lynchburg papers ran a box score of the Negroes from that city who had been executed since 1958 – three.

Wansley has an IQ of 75. His teachers said he never did anything at school but sit and stare out the window. He left at 16, not having completed the sixth grade. He has no criminal record.

At both trials, Wansley's lawyer sought to have him sent to the Central State Hospital in Petersburg for psychiatric examination. The judge dismissed the requests, and a court-appointed psychiatrist, making a cursory examination, found him sane. Attempts to change the venue because of newspaper publicity, and to dismiss the jury because it was all-white, were in vain. In the first trial, the white woman Wansley was said to have raped was not able to identify him. The burden of evidence consisted of alleged confessions he had made to the authorities after his arrest and a supposed re-enactment of the crime at the scene. Thereupon, the prosecutor, a former FBI agent, Royston Jester III, urged the jurors to return the death penalty; if they did not, the residents could not walk safely on the streets. They complied in one hour, 41 minutes.

In the second trial, Wansley was accused of raping a Japanese woman. His defense was that he was in her home at her request and that their sexual relationship was one involving mutual consent. Again, he was found guilty and sentenced to death.

Last year, in Lynchburg, a white used car salesman was convicted of the statutory rape of an 11-year-old Negro girl and received a 20-year sentence.

Who Owns the Senate?

The Democratic Steering Committee has provided an intricate and subtle demonstration of the Southern bloc's mastery of the Senate by exercising almost its only function – assigning new Senators to committees and acting upon the requests of older members for transfers to more important or more prestigious committees. Under the effective management of Senator Russell of Georgia, the committee last week rewarded Western Senators who had voted with the South on the filibuster issue, punished Northerners who voted the other way, and disciplined various rebels of both the left and right. Russell and his colleagues invoked the hallowed custom of seniority when it was helpful, ignored it when it was not.

The one vacancy on Foreign Relations went to Smathers of Florida who has more seniority than Clark of Pennsylvania, a leader in the rules fight. But seniority was ignored in placing Ribicoff (Conn.), a freshman, on Finance instead of Proxmire (Wis.). Conservatives did not want Proxmire on the committee that writes tax legislation because of his long campaign against the oil depletion allowance and other tax privileges. But it must be added that the White House did not want him either because in recent years he has been crusading against deficits and for retrenchment. The orthodox Southerners also disciplined a far right rebel, Strom Thurmond (S.C.), whose fanaticism embarrasses them

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and who was consequently denied a seat on the Rules Committee. Teddy Kennedy, the Senate's most famous freshman, received the treatment the old-timers usually give this kind of star: important but potentially embarrassing assignment on Judiciary (civil rights) and Labor (anti-strike bills).

The Steering Committee ignored seniority in placing Bartlett (Alaska) on Appropriations rather than Yarborough (Texas), who wanted it. Bartlett's appointment was a reward for voting with the South on the filibuster. Another Westerner who voted with the South and was suitably taken care of is freshman Daniel Inouye of Hawaii. He obtained the assignments he desired (Armed Services, Public Works), while other Northern freshmen fared less well.

For 20 years, progressives of both parties fought to gain statehood for Hawaii and Alaska against the obdurate opposition of Southerners. Several years back, a prominent Northern Democrat remarked privately, "I support statehood because I think it would be educational for some of our Southern friends to have a Japanese or Chinese colleague." Statehood has been achieved, and three of the four Senators from Hawaii and Alaska are progressive Democrats, but whom did Inouye, Bartlett and Gruening vote with on the filibuster? Richard Russell.

Senators from thinly-populated or inadequately developed states want reclamation projects, military installations, defense contracts, and harbors and dams. Their Senators are like ambassadors from needy foreign countries; they are judged at home by how big a cash flow they generate in Washington. The way to achieve these tangible benefits is to get on the right committees (Appropriations, Armed Services, Aeronautic and Space) and to cooperate with those who already have power, most of them Southerners. Under Russell's leadership, the Southern bloc uses its power to build alliances with those from the project-and-contract-hungry Western states. Senator Mansfield of Montana, majority floor leader and nominal chairman of the Steering Committee, personifies this alliance.

Of the 15 members of the Steering Committee, seven are Southerners and three (Mansfield, Hayden of Arizona, Bible of Nevada) are Southern-oriented Westerners. There are only five Northern Democrats on the group. Not very surprisingly, the vote on all issues in dispute was 10 to 5.

Last month when the Senate Democrats met in caucus, Joe Clark twice moved unsuccessfully to have the Steering Committee increased by four or two members. He pointed out then that 40 liberal Democrats had only one-third of the places while 27 conservative Democrats had two-thirds of them. The White House lent no support to this initiative. Subsequently, the President's aides did become active in support of another Clark move to change the 11-to-6 division of the Finance Committee by adding two Democrats, making the ratio correspond to the party's 2-to-1 majority in the entire Senate. On the evening before the Steering Committee met, a delegation from Capitol Hill paid an unannounced visit to the White House to inform the President that this change would not pass. The President's visitors were Mansfield, Russell, and Bobby Baker, a protégé of Vice President Johnson and Mansfield's chief aide. Even if the Steering Committee approved the change, they reported, a combination of Republicans and Southern Democrats would defeat it on the floor. The President accepted their judgment.

The next day the Steering Committee duly defeated Clark's motion. It also turned down a proposal to enlarge the Foreign Relations Committee, once a stronghold of enlightened, internationalist sentiment. Now, if Republicans were to make opposition to a nuclear test ban treaty a party issue, the presence on the Committee of such Democrats as Dodd (Conn.), Lausche (Ohio), and Smathers makes it unlikely the treaty could get out of committee. WILLIAM SHANNON

Bomarc for Canada

The dangers of what is called "nuclear proliferation" are hard to overstate. One therefore sympathizes with the Canadian decision not to manufacture its own nuclear weapons. Canada is probably now the only country that could have had a nuclear arsenal and chose not to. That is an example which, if followed, would help slow down the dispersion of these weapons. The refusal of Canada to accept nuclear weapons for her troops in Europe is also commendable, if the Canadians draw the proper implications and join in pressing for an improved NATO force capable of defending Europe without resorting to such weapons.

However, the real issue which lead to the State Department's tactless prodding of Canada to accept nuclear warheads was not Canada's refusal to manufacture such weapons (which the US by and large approves of) or Canada's reluctance to accept them for her troops in Europe. The real issue is Canada's objection to nuclear weapons for her forces in the joint Canadian-US North America Air Defense Command (NORAD).

Although the US will have sufficient nuclear power to deter any rational Soviet attack on this country in the coming years, the Pentagon has nevertheless, and quite correctly, concerned itself with how damage could be reduced in the event a nuclear war should occur. For the next several years at least the major portion of any Soviet attack against the United States – far-fetched as any attack seems – would come from planes attempting to reach this country via the Northern route

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across Canada. The US has asked Canada to accept nuclear weapons for American supplied jet fighters and for American supplied Bomarc missiles which are highly effective against airplanes, *if* they are equipped with nuclear warheads. With them, NORAD could destroy a very large percentage of any attacking airforce and thus reduce substantially the ability of the Soviet Union either to destroy American strategic forces or to inflict large population damage here or in Canada. No system of defense confined to this country could make up for the loss of "defense in depth" supplied by the Bomarc missiles on Canadian territory.

The logic of this argument became clear to the Canadian Government when it agreed to a Joint North American Air Defense Command and hence to the installation of the Bomarc missiles in Canada. There is no public record of a formal agreement to accept nuclear weapons, yet the fact that Washington has supplied Bomarc missiles which are only useful with nuclear warheads to the Canadians suggests that there was an understanding of some kind.

In contrast to the nuclear arming of Canadian and other forces in Europe, the installation of Bomarc ground-to-air missiles in no way implies a first-use-of-nuclear-weapons threat against the Soviet Union. The missiles would only be useful in the event of a large-scale Soviet nuclear bombing attack aimed at the United States. In consequence, an exception can reasonably be made to the general rule that nuclear weapons are best confined to the territories of the major powers and best kept under those powers' control.

Morton Halperin

Siqueiros

Mexico City

Police of the Mexican secret service were searching an abandoned farmhouse in the hills outside Mexico City, 23 years ago. An easel with an unpainted canvas stood in one of the rooms; nearby lay brushes ready for use. In the kitchen there was a suspiciously soft patch on the earthen floor which, after some digging, yielded up a freshly-buried corpse. Quicklime had been poured over it. This grisly discovery was a by-product of the police hunt for a celebrated artist who had used the farmhouse as a hideout. It was thought that the artist had led a machine-gun attack on the Mexico City home of Leon Trotsky a few days before. (Trotsky had come through without a scratch.)

The cadaver proved to be that of an American, Robert Sheldon Harte, who had come down to Mexico to help protect the exiled Trotsky against the Soviet GPU. And now the police thought the fugitive artist might know something, too, about the dead American.

They got their man, David Alfaro Siqueiros, months later in another part of the country.

The police brought him back to Mexico City to stand trial. The charges Siqueiros would have had to face included the murder of Harte, punishable by a 20-year sentence. Various diplomats bestirred themselves. The artist, jumping bail, was spirited with his beautiful wife to Chile, where the Mexican ambassador personally had the requisite visas made out. There followed a pleasant interlude of receptions, art work and Communist activity, after which the couple returned to Mexico. By a logic that puzzled some legal minds, Siqueiros was now a free man. And since he no longer had to stand trial he openly proclaimed his leadership of the unsuccessful machine-gunning attack on Trotsky – "the moment of honor in my life."

In the ensuing two decades Siqueiros continued to embarrass and beautify Mexico, until he did something which, by all practical standards, really tore it. In 1960 he denounced an incumbent President of Mexico in public – calling him a tool of Washington. That is not done in Mexico. The Communist Party, always alert to the scent of martyrdom, made Siqueiros Secretary General in May, 1960. Then in August he was arrested at gunpoint in Mexico City, following a student riot which he was supposed to have incited there.

The aging artist went to jail, just about the time he would have been released had he been found guilty on all counts in the trial that never took place 20 years before. This time there were no influential diplomats, no bail to jump, not even the right of habeas corpus. After he had been behind bars for 19 months, the legalities concluded with an eight-year sentence (minus time already served) for a crime known as "social dissolution."

The *Ley de Disolucion Social* is one of the archeolgical wonders of Mexico. Its paleolithic provisions authorize, for example, up to 12 years of imprisonment for the "dissemination of ideas . . . which disturb public order or affect the sovereignty of the Mexican State." It went into the books during World War II as a means of protecting the nation against Nazi and Fascist agents. At that time Mexican Communists naturally welcomed it as a progressive and peace-loving measure. Oddly enough it was first used in 1958 to convict a pro-Communist teachers union leader.

Art lovers not familiar with the Mexican penitentiaries may be reassured to learn that the 66-year-old artist is able to paint furiously in his cell, turning out up to three canvases a week. These fetch something like $2,000 each; the art world nowadays merges with the business world, and an original Siqueiros is considered a good investment. The work itself, according to critics, shows him at the height of his powers.

Ralph Winnett

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FOREIGN REPORTS

New Man for the Dominicans

★ Juan Bosch, a slim, white-haired 53-year-old man of letters who was in voluntary exile from 1937 to 1961, assumes presidential powers this week in the Dominican Republic – that miserably misgoverned peasant country liberated from Haitian rule in 1844, dominated through 43 presidents and 56 revolutions by landed aristocrats and the Army; then, in 1916, by the US Marines, and subsequently by Trujillo.

Bosch and his Dominican Revolutionary Party won the recent election by a landslide, primarily because they made it a campaign of the poor against the rich. His opponents' "de-Trujilloization" campaign appeared to many not as an effort to rid the country of dictatorial tendencies but to restore the old aristocracy. Appealing directly to the peasants – often by radio – instead of relying on rural landlords to deliver the vote, Bosch gained his biggest majorities in the poorest and dryest rural provinces. Also, he won by an astounding four-to-one margin in the capital, where migrations from the countryside are fast creating an urban proletariat.

Now he must carry out his promises. The Dominican Republic is a fertile and sparsely-populated land. If it diversifies and modernizes its agriculture, it could become a show-case for the Alliance and a breadbasket for the Caribbean. But this cannot happen while the peasant remains wedded to *hacienda* agriculture.

The US promise to eliminate premium prices for foreign sugar over the next 10 years has given the Dominicans a powerful incentive to develop alternative cash crops. Off-season fruits and vegetables, for example, could be major exports to the US. Unused grazing lands could nourish dairy and beef cattle products for export to Puerto Rico's booming meat market. The Yaque River irrigation project being financed by the Alliance for Progress could do much to make the country self-sufficient in rice, one of the staples of its diet.

Bosch has promised to distribute 15 acres apiece to 70,000 peasant families over the next four years, first using the nationalized Trujillo lands and then purchase-expropriations financed by a national agrarian reform tax. Agrarian reform would also include minimum price regulation and formation of dairy and sugar cooperatives combining farm-owners, workers and the government. The program also calls for establishment of government stores to assure a supply of essential goods at low prices and cheap credit for small farmers.

The success of these efforts will depend on the Dominican peasant's ability to make complex market decisions, to use his soil efficiently and to advance his interests by collective bargaining. This will require a confident countryside that is free of repression, and a greatly expanded education program and agricultural extension service. (Until late 1962 there was no agronomy school in the nation; of the three million Dominicans, 60 percent are still illiterates.)

Can all this really be accomplished? Not without political stability, which is still not assured. As the Army was cut back after Trujillo, Bosch reports, the Dominican police force grew from 6,000 to 16,000. He sees it as a potential threat to his regime. The 18 months of close US supervision over the Dominican Republic will almost certainly end when Bosch is inaugurated. There are unlikely to be any more riot control experts from the Los Angeles Police Department imported by AID to teach the Dominican constabulary how to handle unruly mobs; probably less US pressure on the Dominican Education Ministry for such favors as a last-minute switch from cheap Mexican-made primary grade readers – edited in Cuba and printed with a Russian subsidy – to Alliance schoolbooks produced in Puerto Rico and donated to the Dominican Government. US military attachés are likely to continue to discourage the Dominican military from entering politics, but their influence too may diminish.

Nevertheless, the Alliance will continue to be a conspicuous part of Dominican life. The AID mission is reputed to be one of the best in the business. The Peace Corps is working effectively, drilling wells, organizing 4-H clubs to train prospective poultry farmers, and teaching English in the public schools. Under Alliance auspices the Dominicans have acquired a National Planning Board, a National Housing Bank, a Housing Institute and an Industrial Development Corporation. Other projects are in school construction, reforestation (Trujillo denuded some of the nation's best woodlands for his timber exports), agricultural credit and extension services, and a make-work road construction program to get some of the jobless back to work. (Unemployment was 30 percent immediately after the ouster of the Trujillos.)

Bosch is taking over a country of great potential wealth and comparatively few feudal land-holders. If the democratic experiment fails there, the Kennedy Administration will have to ask where in Latin America it can succeed.

Up from Limbo

★ To the Nationalist Chinese, Taiwan has never been more than a limbo from which one day they will depart, back to the Mainland. While there have always been political and ideological motivations for keeping this hope alive, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek must soon face up to a much more practical reason.

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Over 11 million people are stuffed onto Taiwan's 13,885 square miles. Over half the population depends on agriculture for a living, but only one-fifth of the land is arable; there are 4,000 persons per square mile of arable land. (By comparison, the most densely-populated country in the world, the Netherlands, has only 1,133 people per square mile, while the US has less than 200 people per square mile.) The island's birth rate is high; the mortality rate fairly low, with the resulting natural increase rate of 32 people per thousand per year. This rate is equalled by some other countries, but in Taiwan there is nowhere for the people to go. Already the population is creeping up the sides of the mountain ranges that dominate the island and further land clearing is extremely difficult, not to mention expensive and time-consuming.

Nor do the population problems stop here. About five million people are under 15 years of age; each year only about one-half the children who want to go to junior high school can find room in the schools; less than one-half of those seeking a higher education are able to enter a university.

Since half the population is not productive, it is all the more difficult for the Nationalists to produce surpluses for export. Foreign exchange necessary for industrialization and the construction of labor-absorbing industries is therefore lagging behind the rapid rate of population growth.

Birth control is one answer. Yet birth control on a large, government-supported scale is at odds with Chinese moral and political philosophy. Besides, family planning has been tried by the Communists and therefore even more objectionable.

Industrialization is being promoted but is handicapped by the immense military burden the budget must bear (80 percent of the government funds are earmarked for defense and military expenditures), plus the less tangible hindrance of "temporality" that pervades the thinking of men in the middle and high administrative posts on the island. The constant allusion to the return to the Mainland makes it difficult to execute long-range plans and projects. Moreover, the government must constantly battle against the chicanery of underpaid civil servants who make up their living deficit in various extra-legal if not illegal activities. This shakes the confidence of potential investors in government projects and makes the training of men for managerial posts in private enterprise difficult.

The answer, it might seem, is to return to the Mainland, and to quote one high level Kuomingtang member, "If the Generalissimo had even half a chance – with or without the US Navy – he would go."

HIS "TWILIGHT" HAS BEEN PROCLAIMED MANY TIMES

Can de Gaulle Do It?

Paris

The most important fact which has emerged from the crisis brought about in the North Atlantic Alliance as a result of General de Gaulle's policies, is the resistance of the Common Market to all assaults on its unity. Until this supreme test, no one realized how strong were the bonds. Today, however, it is acknowledged that the Market has reached the "point of no return."

To illustrate: as recently as a fortnight ago the Italians, in an outburst against de Gaulle, were speculating along with the Netherlands Vice President, Mr. Mansholt, as to whether the European Coal and Steel Community might not fall to pieces and, even more drastically, whether it might not be advisable to withdraw from the Common Market. And in Germany demonstrations were held proclaiming that, if the Germans had to choose, they would prefer "the United States to de Gaulle."

Experienced observers, however, were not misled. No matter how hostile their sentiments toward Gaullism, they expected no such defections. One of them has just written the following: "Any turning back to the past is absolutely inconceivable. Agreements, cartels and financial interpenetrations make up the cement which binds the Common Market together, and this is a mortar strong enough to weather all political storms. Europe as an economic entity is foreordained, and the big American companies are too deeply committed in Europe to fight against their own interests. For at least 20 years to come the European market will continue to offer the United States too many profitable investment opportunities for that country to seriously consider withdrawing from or ceasing to invest in this market."

If this commentator has correctly summarized the true situation of the Common Market even without Great Britain's participation, several political conclusions must be drawn. First, the US has no strategic or

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economic interest whatever in exerting any type of retaliatory pressure, and it is plain from his press conference of February 14 that Kennedy takes this view. To be sure, Macmillan has told the House of Commons that he will request a joint UK-US approach to any US negotiations with the Common Market; but this can be dismissed fairly lightly as a face-saving gesture and as a reaction to a French stand which is considered humiliating. The only recourse left to the United States is to induce Italy and Germany to participate in a multilateral nuclear force on the same terms already accepted by the British. Any idea of isolating France economically is out of the question.

Secondly, all indications are that General de Gaulle timed his explosive statements of January 14 with deliberate care. Although it was he who, in times gone by, spoke out against the concept of a European economic community, it is not hard to understand why, since his return to power, he has done everything in his power to extend the Coal and Steel Community and even to favor the setting up of common and supranational institutions. It would appear that he has discovered what a perfect implement Europe can be for carrying out a policy he has dreamed of since the very beginning, namely: a role of equality for France *vis-à-vis* the United States in world affairs, and a revising of the division of power which Roosevelt and Stalin established at Yalta.

The third political conclusion which emerges along with the fact of the Common Market's proven stability and power is that Great Britain had many reasons for seeking entry into the European union, and she was grievously wrong in delaying this project so long. Jean Monnet, who went to London in 1950 seeking – in vain – to win over the then British ministers (including Sir Stafford Cripps), foresaw from the beginning that the British would reverse their policy, not so much for economic as for political reasons.

Monnet has just made the following statement to me: "Here we have a great nation, England, which for five centuries was successful in ruling the world by keeping Europe divided against herself. By the turn of the century this great nation was resigned to ruling only a part of the world, and this by associating itself with the United States, since it was the only country able to influence the US. And now, for the past 15 years, Great Britain has discovered that it can no longer keep Europe divided nor, by its own power alone, influence the United States. So it has by only a very slight internal majority made the praiseworthy, in fact staggering decision to abandon its insular position, renounce its isolation, its autonomy, its privileged relations with the Commonwealth, and become a part of the only reality which balances the United States: Europe, and specifically, the Common Market."

In the present situation, one can but speculate as to what de Gaulle plans to do now that he has achieved a victory as precarious as it is temporary. He can, of course, be portrayed as a great man in a vanishing tradition of the past century, and Louis Halle's recent article in *The New Republic* elaborates on this theme with extraordinary accuracy. One is compelled to wonder, however, if certain currents of ideas which influenced the 19th Century are not also to some extent applicable in our own time. For example: are we not today witnessing a furious renaissance of nationalism among the new countries of the uncommitted world? Does the Near East of today not remind one of the Balkans of yesteryear? Did not Stalin build up an empire which made it possible for General de Gaulle to make a common cause with him which superseded the conflict of ideologies? In the last analysis, is there not still a latent chauvinism deep in the heart of all nations which need only be tapped to spring forth? Of course one cannot claim that the natural course of History necessarily encompasses all these factors, nor that they constitute Progress. But this is not enough to justify the conclusion that "de Gaulle is in his twilight." Success can be achieved with old ideas, and it is possible to do the right thing for the wrong reasons.

An example? Surely Algeria is one. If at the end de Gaulle achieved the emancipation of the French colonies, he most assuredly accomplished this in the name of a very contemporary sort of realism and of an opportunism which is not anachronistic. But above all, he succeeded because he did not want the nine million Moslem and Arabian Algerians to intermix with the forty-six million Christian French and Europeans. This seemed to him contrary to "the nature of things" and to the destiny of France. Thus, for reasons of a sort of secret racism, de Gaulle promoted public progress, whereas Soustelle, who saw no difference between the Algerian peasants and those of his native province of Cévennes, became the champion of backward policies through ideas which were in principle generous. And how many modernists realize that Emperor Napoleon III was far more liberal toward Algeria than the combined leftist regimes of the Third and Fourth Republic?

Obviously, then, 19th Century ideas are not necessarily condemned to fail if they carry over and reach their culmination in the 20th Century. The difficulty in the current situation, however, lies in the fact that no one knows just where de Gaulle will carry things in order to fulfill his dream. Already – and this is a sign of progress – he speaks more of Europe (from which, of course, the Anglo-Saxons are excluded) than of "France alone." Although he cannot cherish too many illusions about the Franco-German union, he can, nevertheless, observe that Chancellor Adenauer's representatives at Brussels did not follow through on their

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promise to the United States with respect to favoring Great Britain's entry. He did not restore to the disposal of NATO those French military units withdrawn from it as a result of the war in Algeria. Although he has not come out decisively in favor of a "third force," his collaborators declare that his policy of firmness toward the Russians is much stronger than that of the Americans and especially of the British. And on the way he is creating a movement of independence from the United States which attracts to his cause the European victims of American blunders, plus those elements which are anti-American for reasons of chauvinism, and, secretly, those who vote Communist, though he has not, of course, won over the Communist Party itself. In short, to make "the voice of France" heard loud and clear, he is capable of going very far in terms of contradiction, inconsistency, and audacity. But it is possible that he will succeed, and it would be better for the world at large to realize this. His "twilight" has been proclaimed at least six times since 1950. And each time he has proved that he was at his zenith.

Jean Daniel

ROCKEFELLER

He Has It if He Wants It, and He Does

by Murray Kempton

"I have known Nelson Rockefeller for 23 years. He wears well." – Everett McKinley Dirksen, Chicago, February 9, 1963.

Senator Dirksen is Bishop of the Republican heartland. He is long used to the journey to the gates of the citadel and the delivery of its keys to the invader. The city had fallen unseasonably early this time, but the Bishop was at its undefended gate; experience had taught him that the tone of surrender must be cooperative without being abject. To have recommended Nelson Rockefeller to Chicago as a man who wears well was to go just as far as and no farther than the conqueror could wish.

For one thing, the phrase defined the reality: there is no other candidate for the Republican nomination in 1964 except Nelson Rockefeller who is not either worn out or yet to be tried on. There was the suggestion that Governor Rockefeller might improve with further wear; it is the function of bishops of established faiths to soften reality with the reminder that Providence acts for the best.

Bishop Dirksen also had the tact not to be excessive. He told the Republicans of Chicago that Nelson Rockefeller was of them; but he did not say he was theirs. In point of fact, they are his.

Nelson Rockefeller wanted and needed no warmer words than these. He has come to a position in the Republican Party where he would have more trouble declining its nomination than accepting it. He looks at a party, which, in condition of decay if not in charm, is very like the Williamsburg which confronted his father. The decision to invest seems already made.

But the family policy on works of restoration dictates that the job be done with Rockefeller surveyors, engineers and architects, sparing the sensibilities of the natives as much as possible, but disregarding their advice in design on the sound assumption that afterwards they will be consoled by ceremonial functions as actors in tableaus representing the House of Burgesses, crowned in this case by Barry Goldwater at his ease in a powdered wig.

The Republican Restoration Commission, an anticipatory investment trust, sits in Suite 5600 of 30 Rockefeller Plaza, headquarters of Rockefeller Brothers, Inc. There are no decorations in its waiting room except a gilt plaque of the Governor's father and a gilt bust of his grandfather, at the stage of his life when the urge to serve mankind had quite outworn calculation; but then, of course, there is no sign on the Medici Palace to announce that it is the Medici Palace.

A visitor travels down long halls past *corteges* of Legers, the discard of a Rockefeller taste in the arts that has progressed from the impressionist to the geometric; the Governor seems to leave Roualts behind him as earlier politicians used to leave cigar butts.

There are two retainers but so few other signs of

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humanity that to see an overcoat in an alternate reception room is to feel like Robinson Crusoe finding the footprint. The thickness of the rugs and the tempered steel of the doorknobs combine almost to electrocute upon the touch.

The Kennedys keep a New York office in a warren near Grand Central Station, so shabby that any decoration except the Budweiser poster of Custer's last stand would be improper. These settings are a precise definition of the contest; the Kennedys are a fighting gang; the Rockefellers are an imperial force. The only objects in Suite 5600 which are shabby are five or six muckracking volumes on the depredations of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. They are the most awesome objects of all, trophies of a history long since disregarded; the Rockefellers are endlessly absorbent.

The resident director of the Restoration Commission is George Hinman and his chief assistant is one Thomas Stephens, President Eisenhower's former appointments secretary.

"I'm just a country lawyer from Binghampton," Hinman explains. "Nelson asked me to come down with the Brothers two or three years ago." Hinman also happens to be Republican National Committeeman for New York State; his service to the corporate and charitable functions of the Brothers Rockefeller seems to be the operation of a campaign which is not a campaign at all. Citizens write and offer their help in electing the oldest Rockefeller brother President, and George Hinman sends back a gracious note with a mimeographed copy of the letter he sent the Republicans in California saying that the Governor is uncommitted and no one anywhere is authorized to be active for his nomination.

George Hinman talks to a Republican state leader every now and then; his assignment is "to keep up my background of knowledge as a base for whatever happens" and discourage" any eruption by self-starters who might grab the banner and run."

The atmosphere is relaxed enough to give Tom Stephens ample time for trips to supervise the amenities of President Eisenhower's speaking engagements; the Rockefeller Brothers are in the service of all the Republican Party. A curious stranger could talk all day to Hinman and Stephens and leave (1) charmed and (2) with no evidence either that Rockefeller will ever run for President or that he might not announce tomorrow morning.

The Rockefeller Image

The Governor is to be a receiver in bankruptcy. The traditional Republicans accept him because they have no plausible alternative. He is free alike from the embarrassment of their enthusiasm and the danger of their rancor. He does not have the awful choice between appeasing and avoiding. He can pass off all tenders of support on the high ground that to act like a candidate would be to introduce factions into a party which needs to be united; a candidate who will not even discuss support has no promises to fear.

With poor Nixon in the winding sheet and General Eisenhower more and more content to be a monument, Rockefeller emerges without challenge as the image of the Republican opposition.

Since January, the Governor has made a series of statements defining his discontent with the Kennedy Administration's foreign and domestic policies. The difference is narrow. There can, after all, be very little quarrel between these two men over fundamentals, since Kennedy ran on the Rockefeller Reports and Nelson Rockefeller can only complain that, having stolen them, the President has failed to implement them.

Rockefeller's domestic program can only gratify the President. As an instance, the Governor substantially favors using the Social Security Act for medical care to the aged. His advisers seem automatically to think of issues that normally occur only to Democrats; the President could be in trouble, they say, if he cannot get unemployment down to the four percent level he anticipates in June.

In foreign affairs, those Republicans who still mourn the days when Senator Taft taught us to stand up to our allies must now accept a spokesman who is distressed because the President has pained Mr. Macmillan, affronted General de Gaulle and brought down the Canadian prime minister Mr. Diefenbaker.

Rockefeller has beaten the drum about Cuba with some excess; but he has hardly been any more irresponsible on the subject than Senator Kennedy was in 1960. He has also urged resumption of nuclear testing, but he has always been a Tellerite. None of these are issues with much brimstone; a visitor read a sheaf of the Governor's speeches, and observed that in sum – accepting Cuba as a free zone – they indicated that it was not easy to get the Governor to play the demagogue. "That," one of his advisers said with a smile, "is my agony." The Governor will of course do things in the campaign of which he should be ashamed; almost every candidate does when the fit is upon him; but it is not his normal tone.

Rockefeller might well have done and said all these things without being a candidate for President. He chose a moment in 1960 when there was no hope of reversing the Republican convention to attack the appointed candidate of its choice and to leave a strong impression of dissatisfaction with its incumbent President. As a sovereign prince, he has always a bent for tinkering with great affairs; you could conceive of no other Governor whose intra-office telephone directory lists an extension for Dr. Henry Kissinger, whose field

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is the Cold War in all its ramifications.

The Governor's career has been a continued exercise in deploying the behavioral sciences for the solution of social and international problems. He has always had the flair either to conceive or commission bold ideas and the modesty to give them to statesmen for use on occasions requiring some rhetorical flourish. Roswell Perkins, his adviser on social legislation asserts that Rockefeller gave President Truman the Point Four Program and President Eisenhower the Open Skies Proposal. With the same modesty, he entered the Eisenhower Administration as a mere Undersecretary of Health, Education and Welfare, where he carried Mrs. Hobby's coat and where Perkins remembers him sitting up late at night convincing Republican primates like Congressmen Reed and Taber that they had not merely accepted the social security program but had actually invented it.

Then in 1958, Rockefeller discovered that he had appeal as a candidate for Governor of New York. This revelation is dangerous for a man in middle age, and a certain calculation has entered into his posture. He has thus partly reversed the process by which his grandfather went from calculation to social service; but, as no realist would assert that the old man died cleansed of every trace of calculation, no realist could assume that his grandson walks entirely free of the gospel of social service.

"I don't believe," says George Hinman, "that Nelson thinks there is any problem that cannot be solved."

The Governor sees himself then as a problem solver, where John F. Kennedy must by now see himself as a man who manipulates fixed conditions. Part of the difference is that Kennedy is President and Rockefeller only wants to be President; but much of it is in character and habit. In the deepest sense President Kennedy is a conservative and Governor Rockefeller is an establishment liberal: he seems certain, for example, that if you give the educators all the money they want, properly supervised by Henry Heald, you will have education, and he certainly believes that, when a 14-year-old boy kills another 14-year-old boy in a slum, only society is to blame.

He can, then, properly run against President Kennedy on the promise that he will do the things Kennedy wants to do better than Kennedy can. It is an offering of particularly cold comfort to those Republicans, until now the spirit of the party's covenant, who specifically don't want to do those things President Kennedy wants to do.

Rockefeller criticizes the Administration for its slow progress on civil rights. But the Republicans in the South have been enjoying more and more the favor of voters protesting that the Administration's progress on civil rights has been by no means slow enough.

Rough Rider

"I guess," says Hugh Murrow, one of the Governor's assistants, "that if Nelson is to get anywhere in the South, it will have to be on the fiscal issue."

The fiscal issue is a rather cold comfort, too. Rockefeller's record as a Governor indicates that he would be a high budget, high tax President. His concept of government responsibility is broad; his concept of fiscal policy is pay-as-you-go. If he maintains his present purity, Rockefeller will be the first Republican since Hoover to run without promising a tax cut.

This does not add up to an especially promising campaign against a popular incumbent President; but then there are few promising ways to run against John F. Kennedy. Few of the Governor's advisers would, I think, bet on him now; they need one of those turns of fate which ordinary men cannot predict and which the Kennedys seem, in any case, to have almost occult powers of anticipating.

But then the Governor could have something quite different on his mind. Whatever his calculations, the impact of Nelson Rockefeller on American history may be stronger on the Republican Party than on any other institution. He obviously intends, with as much grace as possible, to dictate his own terms for command. His resources seem too large and his will too strong for him

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to be displaced even after defeat in 1964.

And, by 1968, when Rockefeller has done, the Republican Party will have accepted forever that horrid word "new." The question of Franklin Delano Roosevelt will be closed at last. The long war will be over; and the national consensus established in our politics. The Republican Party will have ceased to believe in the devil.

Schoolmaster Rickover

by Christopher Jencks

The wave of educational soul-searching which swept the American public after Sputnik now seems to be receding. On paper our educational enterprises are better off than they were a few years ago. The shortage of classrooms, although still acute in many slum areas, is slowly diminishing. The supply of qualified teachers is for the moment increasing slightly faster than the number of students. NEA figures show that instructional staff in the public schools has increased 23 percent since Sputnik, while enrollment has increased 13 percent. In all but a handful of states the new teachers are better trained than the old. There are still millions of children studying with untrained and incompetent teachers, and the statistics could be made more impressive at any time by changes in certification requirements and official definitions of "minimal" teacher-student ratios. At least in the high schools, however, there has been a considerable improvement, especially in science and modern languages. Furthermore, many middle-class high schools have taken long overdue steps to improve their college preparatory programs by reforming traditional curricula, developing honors programs, introducing college level courses and hiring teachers competent to conduct them. This has placated some articulate college-educated parents.

Yet none of these improvements has appreciably diminished the fundamental parochialism of the majority of schools, the stultifying social standards imposed by the students on one another and tacitly supported by the teachers, the chauvinistic self-congratulatory view of the world conveyed by textbooks and staff alike, the subordination of education to community solidarity symbolized by such practices as appointing football coaches to be school superintendents and building palatial assembly halls for community festivities while providing no money for hiring top teachers. All this and more persists. Should we not therefore welcome anyone who tries to stoke the dying fires of reform? I have often thought so. But after rereading the work of our leading educational gadfly, Hyman Rickover, I am not sure. It is true that education is now on dead center, but the movement which Admiral Rickover wants would, it seems to me, be a move in the wrong direction.

Beleaguered teachers often see Admiral Rickover simply as the leading spokesman of the Council for Basic Education, the traditionalist group which published his book *Swiss Schools and Ours: Why Theirs Are Better*. This is certainly unfair. Rickover is much more than a military equivalent of California's Superintendent of Schools, Max Rafferty. Rafferty seems to be mainly worried about our children's moral fiber, angry that his children aren't taught to read the way he was, and distressed to find that driver training and the study of Eskimos have replaced *amo, amas, amat*. Rickover's views are more sophisticated. He shares with the Council (and the many more or less erudite Tories for whom it speaks) a feeling that we should get back to the Three R's, that we have been befuddled and misled by Dewey and Freud, and that schools should be more like Ivy League universities. But he is rarely the victim of nostalgia, except about the virtues of phonic reading instruction. His criticism of the schools rests on an appraisal of what America is becoming rather than a dream of what it once was. The appraisal is probably wrong, but it must be taken seriously – especially by teachers, who seem to me to share many of Rickover's prejudices though neither he nor they know it.

It is probably no accident that Rickover has concentrated so much of his educational criticism on comparisons between American and European schools. (In addition to *Swiss Schools and Ours*, published last year by Little Brown, the House Appropriations Committee has issued Rickover reports on English and Russian education.) As he explains in his study of Swiss education, he thinks that America's "over-abundant" natural resources made the inhabitants rich and stupid. Now, having failed to conserve our resources or to curb our population, the day of reckoning is approaching. Unless we learn to live by our wits, as the less fortunate

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Europeans (and especially the Swiss) have always had to do, both our economy and our diplomacy will become increasingly impotent.

This Calvinistic revulsion against easy affluence, the insistence that we must work to prosper, is still widespread in America. It is especially characteristic of those who are deeply involved in the Cold War – men who still believe that life is a race and goes to the swift, not the personable. (Is this because in diplomacy, unlike business, power and competition are still the dominant themes?)

Rickover is in this tradition. Creator of the nuclear submarine and enemy of bureaucratic standpatism, his is the style of the McNamara Pentagon, one of the few big American enterprises whose top officials believe that inefficiency and incompetence could cost them their livelihood. Waste and inefficiency offend him, for they weaken America. One of his main charges against American education, for example, is that Americans spend several years longer in school than Europeans aiming for comparable jobs, but emerge no better educated. Our doctors know no more medicine (and no more literature) than English doctors, yet we take two or three years longer to train them. The same for lawyers, businessmen, teachers and craftsmen. Taken as a purely factual observation this seems to me largely correct. European universities are roughly comparable to American graduate schools, both in the small fraction of the population they train and in the high technical level of the training. European academic and technical secondary schools are, in turn, roughly comparable in both their selectivity and their educational objectives and achievements to American undergraduate colleges. As Rickover says, these differences arise from the "stretch-out" which takes place in the American junior and senior high schools, where six years are devoted to material which the better pupils could handle in three or four years. (Experiments dating back to Hutchins' arrival at Chicago have shown over and over that the more ambitious American students can handle college level work by the time they are 15 or 16, as they do in Europe. But schools are not organized, nor teachers trained, with this objective paramount.)

To Rickover time is precious and wasting it sinful. But is the European system not also wasteful? English schools, for example, mostly separate the sheep from the goats at "eleven plus," siphoning the gifted into grammar schools and the rest into secondary modern schools. The grammar schools are designed to prepare their pupils for university work. The secondary modern schools are terminal institutions for those who have not demonstrated the ability to master a rigorous academic program. This system looks reasonable enough on paper. The only flaw is that nobody knows how to predict whether an 11-year-old will profit from an academic curriculum or not. You would never know it from reading Rickover's long commentary before the House Appropriations Committee, but soon after "eleven plus" children enter adolescence. This often has the most startling effects on personalities, aptitudes, motives. Many of the adept become apathetic; many of the dull show new diligence and talent. By making almost irrevocable decisions before any of this has happened the English system deprives many gifted children of academic opportunities, while opening the grammar schools to many others who will not complete the course. (The handful of English towns which have set up comprehensive secondary schools show 50 to 100 percent more of their 15-year-olds passing the national "GCE" exams than do the communities which segregate at eleven-plus.)

Is it better to waste talent than time? Is it better for children to play games in a junior high school, learning very little but keeping the doors open in case an intellectual impulse hits them later; or is it better to put the more diligent children into accelerated schools and tell the rest to become stevedores? The answer depends, I should think, in part on the preferences of the children and their parents, and in part on the needs of society. Rickover does not discuss either in the American context. Let me turn to them in order.

Education and Democracy

The Admiral seems to be somewhat confused about the relationship of education to democracy. That is hardly surprising. So am I. But I have the feeling that the Admiral would rather not face up to the difficulties. At times he says that the vital factor in getting good schools is to hire good teachers and then leave them alone. He laments the fact that local school boards try to set academic standards reflecting their parochial view of the world, and he is appalled to discover that they choose school principals from the physical education department more often than from any other. But at the same time he argues that the only way to reform the schools is to arouse the public and break the hold of the profession on teacher training, certification, and so forth. Comparing America to 19th Century England he concludes that the schools will never reform themselves. National legislation will be required. Perhaps. But Rickover neglects to note that the reform of 19th Century English education was in essence a struggle between the old clerical teachers and the new secular scholars. In that struggle Parliament sided with the scholars. Today's struggle in America is between lay boards of education and the standards of university scholarship, and in that contest Congress is emphatically not on the side of scholarship. At present I would guess that lay control is incompatible with every

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major change Rickover wants.

A 1958 Gallup Poll, taken a few months after Sputnik, tells the story: the interviewers found that nine school officials in ten thought that students should be given more homework, but that only five parents in ten agreed. Nor is this an isolated instance. Anyone familiar with our schools knows that only on a few prosperous middle-class communities does the public want higher standards, advanced courses, ability grouping and other symbols of a college-oriented school program along Rickover lines. In most communities the parents want the pupils to become "well-rounded," by which they mean football stardom and student council presidencies. School is a prelude to running an insurance firm and heading the Kiwanis.

The Admiral seems to think that school administrators who talk about "educating the whole boy" have been corrupted by the courses they take in schools of education. If so, they are unique. Most people who take such courses are so bored that 20 minutes after completing the final exam they cannot even remember who gave the lectures. My guess is that superintendents accept the rhetoric of life adjustment not because they are brain-washed in college but because it seems to justify the unambitious approach they know they must have to get on with the school board and the parents. Having adopted the rhetoric, most schoolmen come to believe it, and find it hard to adapt to a new and more ambitious school board if they get one.

Looking back at the Gallup Poll it would seem logical for a man of Rickover's convictions to want more professional control over the schools, not more pressure from laymen. Or does he only mean pressure from the kind of laymen who read his books, not the kind who attack the principal for putting Johnny in a "slow" class because of his IQ scores. (European education is today run by the profession, not laymen. That is why it is free to follow Rickover's ascetic requirements.)

Uneducated Working Class

All of which brings us around to the second question, namely whether Rickover's ideals really make sense for modern America. I cannot see that they do. The only respect in which America's problems seem to be growing more like Europe's traditional ones is that we are more involved in international competition. Our problem does not seem to me to be that our elite is under-educated; our problem is that our working class is under-educated and increasingly unemployable. The number of students finishing college in America is roughly double the number finishing secondary school in England and Switzerland. While many of these BA's are "soft," the better half are probably a fair match for English or Swiss secondary school graduates. If they aren't, Rickover certainly never presents any detailed evidence of it, and I know of none.

Rickover's main complaint is not that American adults know less than Europeans, but that they *take longer to learn the same amount*. Why is this so alarming? Barring such improbable developments as an Administration committed to sharing the work out among the whole labor force, there seems to me to be no prospect of full employment in America for the forseeable future. So long as we have less than full employment, employers will avoid hiring young immature men and women who change jobs, get drafted, have babies, and generally make for trouble in the personnel office. What is to be done to keep such people off the streets? By cutting down the number of hours spent in school, the amount of work taken home, and the length of the school year, America manages to keep them busy a few extra years until they are slightly more employable. Is this wasteful? It costs no more than paying unemployment insurance, and probably helps keep down juvenile crime.

The Admiral argues that given the rising birth rate and the growing demand for public expenditure in other areas, we "cannot afford" to use schools as make-work projects for the young. Why can't we? Contrary to popular belief, there is no apparent limit to how much the American people will spend on education. The total has risen steadily over the past generation, both in terms of dollars per pupil and as a percentage of the gross national product. The prospect is for further increases. American parents indulge their children in every other way. Are the schools then likely to be the exception?

The Admiral is, however, opposed to indulging anyone, including children. As a result, he speaks to the millions of middle-class fathers who think their sons expect too much and strive too little, who have laboriously carved a niche for themselves and resent seeing their children slip into it effortlessly. Indulgence, he seems to tell them, leads people (and nations) into a bad "posture." If your posture is bad, you don't stand up well working the 60 hour week – which Rickover seems to expect not only of himself and his military colleagues but of the whole country.

Rickover seems to see America as a vast extension of the defense establishment, a kind of super-Manhattan Project in which everyone must strive day and night to achieve some as yet secret objective. Why? The sacrifices he demands of the young in this quest are truly heroic – that they should give up their leisure, submit to crucial decisions about their future at an early age, and dedicate themselves wholly to self improvement. It seems a vision more suited to a religious community than an educational one. Perhaps that is why it appeals to us.

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Hugh Massingham

Labour's New Leader

"The great question mark is not whether Harold Wilson has the intelligence or the flair for politics. . . . It is in the realm of character that the doubts begin."

London

There must be Americans who would have much preferred George Brown to succeed Hugh Gaitskell and be the leader of the British Labour Party rather than Harold Wilson. Seen from 2,000 miles away Mr. Brown looks the honest English bull-dog – patriotic, loyal, forthright, a good friend and a bad enemy. There is a certain amount of truth in this. In some ways he is a very simple man, and the result is that we know exactly what his attitude is to nearly all the problems that bother us. Mr. Brown is for the Anglo-American alliance. He is for NATO. Although his voice has been muted, there is little doubt that he was in favor of Britain joining the Common Market. All the same there are grave defects in Mr. Brown's character. He is deeply emotional and might, in a sudden fit of anger, have committed Britain (and the West) to some foolishness that would have ended in disaster.

Mr. Wilson is a much more complicated and devious character. He is so clever that he can see a difficulty even before it appears on the most distant horizon. He often seems to veer this way and that. There is seldom anything clear-cut about him. He is for America and he is also for Russia. He has never been for unilateral disarmament but he has sometimes made noises that have suggested he secretly supported that point of view. There was a good example of his methods when he was speaking in the House of Commons the other day. The next Labour Government, he said, would be Socialist – a sentiment that at once raised cheers from the Left. He would not go neutralist – cheers from the Center. He would stand by NATO – cheers from the Right. It is hardly surprising if Mr. Wilson is sometimes thought to be a rather slippery customer.

This is the bad side, but there is another that is seldom mentioned by his critics. Mr. Wilson is a man of the people in a way that Hugh Gaitskell never was. Gaitskell's conception of leadership was that he must first of all make up his mind and then impose his will on the rank-and-file. He was quite inflexible. In the end he gave the Party a fairly coherent policy, but he had also killed some of the grass roots in the process. The old enthusiasm had largely gone. Hence the apathy even in these by-elections where Labour had a good chance of winning the seat. Party workers were no longer prepared to go out in the rain and rouse the faithful. They stayed at home to watch the telly.

Mr. Wilson will be a different kind of leader. He will model himself on Clement Attlee, the most successful master of the political art the Labour Party has ever known. He will at all times listen to the voices of ordinary bewildered people. Not that he will tamely accept a decision based on ignorance or prejudice. All the same he understands that a democracy cannot work without education. The people can be right all the time only when they have been honestly presented with the facts.

He is 46 years old and thus belongs to the same generation as Mr. Kennedy. He has few of the President's advantages. He has not a commanding presence. He has not got a beautiful young wife. He is not even gifted with a silver tongue. Though he can be witty in debate, he has never yet swayed an audience or a nation by the magic of words. It would be quite wrong, however, to conclude from this that he is a little man. There is a sense in which he and the President have a good deal in common. Neither of them is impressed by the shibboleths and slogans of the old world.

The great question mark is not whether Harold Wilson has the intelligence or the flair for politics: he has these in abundance. It is in the realm of character that the doubts begin. Unlike the President there were no golden spoons in his mouth when he was born. Mr. Wilson has come up the hard way, and although there are no obvious chips on his shoulder, no man who has had to struggle since childhood survives without accumulating a number of scars. All the same, now that he has his heart's desire, the hope is that he will grow in stature. In a sense his greatest handicap is that he has always been a brilliant man of promise. He swept the board at Oxford. He was the youngest Cabinet Minister since Pitt. His career suggests a triumphant progress, an effortless life with admirers strewing flowers so that he would not bruise his feet. The exact opposite is true. Mr. Wilson has had to scheme, to compromise; he has often had to take one step backwards

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in order to advance two steps forward. So he was the late Aneurin Bevan's lieutenant at the beginning of the great Bevanite quarrel in the Labour Party and then went over to Gaitskell when it must seem that it was expedient to do so. Nor is this all. Hugh Gaitskell was never sure of his loyalty. Two years ago, in 1960, he opposed Gaitskell in the election for the leadership.

There is an answer to many of these doubts. There is no reason, for instance, why Mr. Wilson should not have run against Hugh Gaitskell: after all, the Labour Party is a democratic movement. What is more, Gaitskell was not the unmixed blessing that he is often supposed to have been. He made terrible mistakes. He had no flair for politics. Although the Party was united at the time of his death, he needlessly created one civil war after another. One often felt that he had little understanding of democracy. Mr. Wilson will rule the Party much more skillfully. Unless he ruins everything by being far too clever by half – his besetting sin – he will be on the political scene for a long time to come.

Soviet Freedom: A Balance Sheet

by Jeremy R. Azrael

"Easing of Curbs on Soviet Literature Is Attributed to Order by Khrushchev," – headline, *The New York Times*, November 29, 1962

"Soviet Eases Curb on Artists, Allows Show of Abstract Work," – headline, *The New York Times*, December 1, 1962

"Soviet Orders Disciplining for Cultural Avant-Garde," – headline, *The New York Times*, December 4, 1962

"Soviet Extends Campaign on Art; Criticism of Avant-Garde Spreads to Provinces," – headline, *The New York Times*, December 8, 1962

These headlines are symptomatic not only of the mercurial temperament of even the most sober American reportage about the Soviet Union but also of the ambiguity and complexity of current Soviet developments. In Stalin's last years, the Soviet scene was characterized by a rigidity which bordered on immobility; in the decade since Stalin's death, it has been characterized above all by change. Many analysts have identified this change with progress and have discerned a steady, albeit more or less halting, trend toward "liberalization" and even "democratization." Others have been less sanguine, but the tone of optimism reflected in the first two of the headlines cited above has tended to dominate the writing of a number of extremely influential Western journalists. This tone is justified in some respects; however, it frequently becomes too strident. The reader is too rarely reminded that what is involved is a comparison with Stalinism, and that even here important qualifications are necessary.

Freedom from fear. The most dramatic change in Soviet life since the death of Stalin has been the virtual disappearance of all-pervasive, mass terror. The average Soviet citizen no longer lives in constant dread of arbitrary arrest; basic concern for his self-preservation no longer forces him to treat all human relationships with suspicion and mistrust, as possible sources of provocation or incrimination. The significance of this change, which has transformed the entire atmosphere of Soviet life, can scarcely be overestimated. However, the elimination of mass terror has not been accompanied by the elimination of widespread political coercion or the establishment of "rule of law."

The secret police retain an extensive network of informers and have official representatives in almost all important Soviet organizations. Moreover, their functions, though curtailed, still go beyond the control of those activities which impinge on the area of "state security," an area which the Soviet regime continues to define in the widest possible terms. For example, the secret police have recently been empowered to initiate *administrative* proceedings which can result in up to five years exile at forced labor for those whom the regime classifies as "parasites." The definition of "parasite" has purposely been left vague, but it is indicative that the term (and in some cases, we know, the corresponding penalty) has already been applied to religious leaders, young dissident poets, students who have refused to "volunteer" for work in Siberia, citizens who have accepted material aid from relatives abroad, and persons who have talked too freely to foreigners. In addition, even where the police act through the courts, "rule of law" leaves much to be desired. Soviet courts still exercise their prerogative to classify some crimes as "especially socially dangerous" and hence to punish

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them with severity beyond that envisioned in the law. In the best of circumstances, they enforce a law which treats such things as the unauthorized possession of Western newspapers, the repetition of news gleaned from Western broadcasts, and attempts to flee the country as "especially serious state crimes" and which specifically defines its major function as "*the greatest possible* defense of . . . the state." (Italics added.)

Finally, in order to ensure that the elimination of terror does not lead to a decline in its control, the regime has established a number of so-called "public organizations" with quasi-police and quasi-judicial functions. These "public organizations" are designed not only to serve as additional law enforcement agencies but also to legitimize the control of those spheres of behavior which are not regulated by law. They thus represent a basic assault on all residues of privacy within the system. Cases are known of "volunteer militia brigades" detaining and roughing up Soviets found in the company of foreigners, arresting people whose taste in clothes or hair style deviates from accepted norms, breaking up gatherings in private apartments in which "decadent" music was being played, dispersing crowds at sanctioned but disapproved poetry readings, etc. "Comrades courts," which have the authority to expose their victims to "public shaming" and impose fines, have been told that their basic task is to deal with citizens who, while legally innocent, manifest signs of succumbing to "alien bourgeois ideology" or otherwise deviate from "Communist morality." And "public meetings," consisting of neighbors or fellow workers, have been authorized (along with the police) to initiate administrative proceedings culminating in exile at forced labor. They have been called on to take an ever greater part in the struggle against "parasites, loafers, and idlers." These activities have all been depicted as signs of the increasing "democratization" of Soviet life. In fact, however, all of the "public organizations" are under the firm control of the regime and what their establishment represents is not "democratization" and certainly not a turn toward legality but rather the institutionalization of a variety of non-spontaneous, anti-individualist, vigilante justice.

Freedom of Expression. If the elimination of mass terror has not brought liberty in its wake, it is nonetheless an essential precondition for the growth of liberty. The most dramatic evidence that such a growth is actually underway is to be found in the realm of literature. A number of Soviet writers, particularly younger writers, have dared to probe the tolerance of the regime and to seek to broaden it. Their courage has been impressive, but of even greater consequence is the success they have managed to achieve by maintaining their solidarity with one another and vigorously exploiting every sign of hesitation on the part of and disagreement within the regime. They have managed to redeem a considerable part of the suppressed heritage of Russian literature and to air social and human problems that the regime would much prefer to deny or ignore.

However, their victory has been far from total. In appraising literary freedom in the USSR, Westerners are too apt to stress the literature of "de-Stalinization," forgetting that the Khrushchev regime, for reasons of its own which have little to do with libertarianism, actively encourages such literature and that those authors who try to use their writings as vehicles of overt political dissent are not published and are in some cases imprisoned. In addition, they often fail to note that the range of stylistic freedom is much narrower than the range of substantive freedom and that all but the most cautious experiments in form are still prohibited. Finally, they pay too little heed to those themes in the work of the literary "rebels" which signify either costly compromise with the regime *or* – and this is a much more disturbing alternative – the presence of complacency with respect to the present state of affairs. To cite but one example, Evgeny Evtushenko, in a recent poem which was much publicized as an attack on Stalinism, actually devoted the bulk of his verse to expressions of satisfaction with the current climate in the Soviet Union.

> *I reject the appellation* thaw *they have given it –*
> *This is spring, it's truly spring*
> *though harsh.*

The fact is that spring has not really begun, even for the writers, or, if it has, it is in danger of retreating if it is taken so for granted. As for those whose calling is non-literary, the thaw has scarcely begun and there are disturbing signs of a recrudescence of the winter freeze.

On the situation of those Soviet painters who are inclined to non-representationlism, Abraham Brumberg's report two week ago told the story and no further comment is necessary. Suffice it to say that, after Khrushchev's recent intervention on behalf of orthodoxy (referred to in the last two of the headlines cited previously), it is unlikely that such painters will be given another opportunity to put their work on wide public display, although (and this is an index of the changes which have occurred) smaller semi-private showings may continue. Among scholars and scientists too the "liberals" have recently been subjected to increased pressure, and in the crucial realm of modern history the advocates of honesty and objectivity have

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Jeremy R. Azrael *is with the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. This is the last of three articles on Soviet freedoms.*

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been decisively rebuffed by the regime.

Finally, for the average citizen genuine freedom of expression remains largely a chimera. Now, as under Stalin, criticism of the *implementation* of official policy is encouraged, but the top leaders and the policy itself are sacrosanct and public participation in policy creation is as illusory as ever. The citizen, while still denied freedom of speech, *does* now have a considerably more freedom of conversation. This is an important gain and a significant manifestation of the newfound possibilities for mutual trust and confidence within society. However, even here one must be cautious – as, indeed, are Soviet citizens themselves. Secret police informers have not disappeared; indulgence in "anti-Soviet propaganda" is still classified as an "especially serious state crime"; and prosecutions for spreading "hostile rumors" are known to have occurred and are reported to have been resumed for telling "political jokes."

Freedom of Worship. One additional form of expression – religious – demands special mention, if only briefly. Here there has been a definite decrease in freedom. First, a considerable number of clergymen, including Orthodox bishops, Catholic priests, rabbis, mullahs and Protestant pastors have been arrested. Some clergymen, as already noted, have been exiled as "parasites" and all have been classified as liable to exile by dint of their very status. Second, many churches and some of the few remaining synagogues have been forcibly closed. Third, there has been a marked recrudescence of articles with anti-Semitic overtones in the Soviet press, and a violent and hysterical campaign complete with "show trials" has been launched against sectarians of all sorts. Finally, there have been a number of cases reported in the Soviet press in which parents who have sought to transmit their religious heritage to their children have been deprived of their "parental rights" and had their children removed to state homes. Moreover, all these measures are but the first steps in what promises to be a full-fledged anti-religious campaign. The regime has placed the realization of complete Communism on the agenda and this requires the liquidation of all "survivals of the past," of which religion is one of the most widespread and conspicuous.

Freedom of Property and Work. In a campaign the motives of which are rather similar to those of the anti-religious campaign and which likewise promises to increase in intensity, the regime has begun to constrict the still officially tolerated sphere of private property. Despite an acute housing shortage, state loans to finance the construction of private, one-family dwellings have been discontinued and pressure is even being applied to end the construction of summer cottages with private funds and to force the transfer of all those already built to the state. Similarly but much more significantly, the regime is acting to deprive the peasantry of their small private garden plots despite the fact that these plots are a major source of supply in a food-scarce economy. The reason for these measures, as official accounts make clear, is not merely that private property as such is ideologically unacceptable but also that the regime fears that its growth, or even its maintenance now that the level of terror has dropped, will lead to a weakening of state control and the development of a sense of and basis for personal autonomy.

Yet another reason is economic; the regime fears that private property will lead to a withdrawal of labor from the state sector in a labor-scarce, state-directed and state-oriented economy. Labor, the regime is determined, shall remain exclusively at the disposal of the state. Nor is the matter strictly one of state versus private sectors. Soviet students are still forced to accept state-assigned jobs for at least three years upon graduation from college or, in many cases, high school. In addition, thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of Soviet citizens have been all but physically forced to accept job assignments in frontier regions. It is true that the bulk of the workers can now leave their jobs at will whereas under Stalin they could leave only with official permission. However, it is noteworthy that Khrushchev has expressed concern that this new freedom is being too widely exercised. Already agronomists have been forbidden to leave their posts without permission, and the Soviet leader has just strongly hinted that steps to curtail the freedom of other categories of workers may be imminent.

One could go on discussing various dimensions of freedom on the Soviet scene almost *ad infinitum*, but perhaps enough has been said already to make clear the dangers of equating the important changes which are taking place in the USSR with progress toward liberty and democracy. For the present, at least, the Soviet citizen is significantly less free not only than his counterpart in Western democracies but also than his counterpart in the dictatorial regimes of Franco, Salarzar and their ilk. Moreover, in some respects, the direction of change seems to be toward yet greater regimentation and control, though without mass terror. Where freedom is greater, it is so most often by the grace of the regime rather than by conquest, and this makes its status uniquely precarious and vulnerable. The regime is gambling that by moderating the incredible harshness and fanatical obscurantism of its predecessor it can win greater domestic support and international prestige without at the same time suffering any meaningful erosion of its total monopoly of power. It may well be right; so far at least the evidence would tend to sustain its hope of success. Yet the winds of change are variable and never wholly subject to control.

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Nassau Reconsidered

What Can America and Britain Do Now?

by Alistair Buchan

The climate of the West has altered so dramatically in the weeks since Nassau that it is hard to recall the official attitudes that preceded it. They were the days when politicians talked of an Atlantic partnership, of "twin pillars," of "dumbbells," when French officials hinted at Anglo-French cooperation on missiles, when British spokesmen hinted at Britain's participation in a European system of deterrence, and when some American spokesmen hinted at American acquiescence in the strategic autonomy of a united Europe. No more of these hints or phrases have been heard since Nassau. What began as an Anglo-American haggle over alternative weapons systems, evolved in fact into a US-UK agreement on political grand strategy, which looked forward to the events of January – France's rupture of the EEC negotiations, the fight between France and the Five, the signature of the Franco-German treaty – which the agreement itself had made almost certain. A fundamental decision was taken in the Bahamas that the United States would, with British support, embark upon the reconstruction of a single trans-Atlantic system of political consultation and strategic control in NATO, lest France's dominance in Europe make the earlier alternative too dangerous. A cycle of American policy which opened in the spring of 1961 with President Kennedy's firm advice to Mr. Macmillan to enter the European Community had thus closed before the events which justified its closure had occurred.

If de Gaulle's rupture of the President's "grand design" was inevitable, it is fortunate that these US-UK decisions were reached early, and without any fumbling for an alternative in the wake of January's disasters. For the European Five, despite the harsh words exchanged with France at Brussels, despite the firm attitudes of Fanfani, Schroeder, Spaak and Luns, have not really got much stomach for a fight with Paris on their own. They have too much to lose if resistance to the political designs of France should cause permanent damage to the Economic Community itself, and the sense of European identity which the Community itself has done so much to foster creates a natural ambivalence if their governments are asked to take sides between Washington and Paris. The important question, therefore, is whether the Anglo-American political alternatives to the concept of Atlantic partnership are likely to be successful in limiting France's influence in Europe and the world, until a different assessment of France's power and interests prevails in Paris.

Since the control of nuclear weapons has become the touchstone of international confidence, the Nassau decision to take a positive initiative on the creation of a system of multilateral control was inevitable and correct. The difficulty for the European countries, and for NATO as a whole, arises from a choice between two different methods of approach which are concealed within the Nassau communique.

The first is the well-known American proposal for the creation of a multilateral seaborne force under the control of some special multilateral authority in NATO. As the proposal emerged from Nassau and subsequent discussion this force would eventually have four elements: a British component of some five or six Polaris submarines, an equivalent contribution from the American Polaris fleet, a French contribution that is now purely hypothetical, and a force of submarines or surface ships belonging to NATO itself and manned jointly by those NATO non-nuclear powers who decided to subscribe. This is a long-term plan, looking to a point in the late 1960s when the force has been constructed, which welds control and ownership together.

But paragraph Six of the Nassau communique, which is of British drafting, implies a rather different approach. It envisages the immediate creation of a NATO nuclear command of which the basic elements would be British Bomber Command, the SAC bombers still based in Europe, perhaps the American Polaris submarines "earmarked" for NATO last year. Most important of all, it offers a place within the system of NATO control to those NATO non-nuclear powers who have got important tactical nuclear weapons, aircraft or missiles. It is a more pragmatic approach but capable of immediate application.

Both plans represent a profound change in the British and American attitude to NATO, in that they imply a decision to make NATO itself part of the process of

ALISTAIR BUCHAN *is the Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London.*

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strategic planning and control, and they are not in the long run intended to be mutually exclusive. They do, however, present the non-nuclear powers in NATO with different alternatives to support in 1963, and it is therefore important to decide which is likely to prove most attractive to the European powers, and in particular to Germany. Which is most likely to mobilize support within the Atlantic system for a resistance to the French vision of an independent European strategy and a separate European *haute politique.*

One cannot but admire the hard work that has gone into the American proposals for a multilateral force: the military calculations of how crews made up of several nationalities could be trained and welded into one; the legal research on multinational ownership; the financial and technical estimations. There seems little doubt that the multinational element in the NATO seaborne force could be made to work. And it has the advantage that, at a time when the American public is becoming restive at bearing so high a share of the costs of Western defense, access to control must go hand in hand with a country's willingness to make some financial sacrifice towards the cost of building and maintaining the force. Moreover, it meets a standard European military argument that a country cannot play an influential role in the process of NATO planning unless its representatives are deeply involved in the technology of the relevant weapons.

Obstacles to the American Plan

Its disadvantages seem to me fourfold. The first is the obverse of its chief advantage, namely that the European non-nuclear powers and Canada will be faced with the alternative of expanding their defense budgets at a time when the pace of economic growth is decelerating, or diverting resources from their conventional forces, despite American insistence that they should increase the latter. The costs of constructing and maintaining the multinational element of the multilateral force may appear modest by American standards or even in relation to the $18 billion that Canada and the European NATO countries spend on defense. But if one exempts a recalcitrant France, a Britain that is building its own separate weapon, countries like Greece and Turkey that are too poor to contribute, and the Scandinavian countries which may be inhibited by their domestic politics, then the cost to the rest could represent an increased defense expenditure of the order of 12 percent, or enough to make finance ministries wince. Without Canada the cost to the Five would be even higher.

Hence it becomes an open question whether these countries and especially Germany (which by any burden sharing formula based on national income would carry the lion's share of the cost), will wish to subscribe such resources to a force which, unlike the British force, does not guarantee them freedom of action in an acute emergency, does not earn them influence with the Pentagon which is interested in their conventional forces, and exposes them to acute Soviet hostility. If the long period of gestation which the American plan necessitates is marked by the usual friction over costs, a fertile seed bed for the French assertion that the whole idea of a multilateral force is just a device to sell surplus American weapons to Europe might also be laid.

Third, the American plan seems to raise the question of whether political confidence can be enhanced by a share in a force for which there is no obvious military requirement. If the existing American strategic forces are as effective and diverse as Secretary McNamara claims, is there likely to be allied enthusiasm for participating in a project which merely adds to the American "over-kill"? In theory, there is since this is a NATO force in whose deployment and potential use the American voice will be important but not decisive; it therefore gives the European allies some control over the plan for strategic retaliation in the event of an attack on Europe. But here the characteristics of the Polaris missile which, in the foreseeable future has only sufficient accuracy for a counter-city role, are relevant. In the over-all American strategy such weapons are now to be kept in reserve in a nuclear exchange until Minuteman and more accurate systems have effectively disarmed the Soviet Union. The development of the multilaterally controlled force around Polaris will either necessitate a revision of this strategy to a simpler one of early general retaliation or else some overriding American control on the timing of the use of the NATO force must be built in, which would destroy much of its political purpose.

Finally, there are the aspects both of stability and of burden sharing. Is it wise in the interests of a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union deliberately to augment the Western strategic superiority by, say, another 18 submarines (12 NATO owned, 6 British) or nearly 300 missiles? Will the United States accept this kind of European expenditure as a shifting of its own burdens? If so, will the size of the American Polaris fleet be cut back from its planned level of 41 boats to, say, 21? An immediate decision is required since 17 have been built or are building and 35 have already been authorized.

The implications of the somewhat different British approach to the problem have been obscured by the Macmillan government's political necessities which have forced it to concentrate public attention on the salvage, by its own Polaris deal, of a theoretic capacity for independent strategic action in some unimaginable crisis, rather than on its more constructive initiative in

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deciding to place the whole of RAF Bomber Command under the planning control of NATO.

Stripped of its political reservations, the British suggestion is that NATO control of nuclear weapons be constructed around those that exist and which already have an agreed military application to the security of Europe itself. This primarily means the interdiction of major military movements in Eastern Europe, such targets as Soviet communications, airfields and missile bases. The core of this force would be the V-Bombers, redirected from strategic targets deep in Russia itself to NATO interdiction targets against which they should remain effective for many years to come, plus the American Polaris submarines already committed to NATO. But these are not the only countries involved: Canada will shortly have 140 F-104s with a nuclear capability in Europe: Germany has the MACE missile and other medium-range interdiction weapons: and several other countries, Italy, Belgium, Holland, have forces that are involved in this role. These forces will need continuous modernization over the years which will need an interdependent effort towards new missiles or vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. Why not, it is argued, found the principle of multilateral control on those countries whose governments might be involved in an early and agonizing decision to unleash nuclear interdiction and thus expose themselves to great dangers, rather than on a new seaborne force whose military function is still obscure? The actual weapons can remain under existing national control under a central commander, while the nations involved are drawn into a special relationship within NATO.

The advantages of such an approach are, first, that it involves no new diversion of resources on the part of the European countries, a consideration that becomes increasingly important as the cost of improving the quality of their conventional forces increases. Second, it establishes the principle that countries who are involved in a particular kind of military risk have a right to participate in the planning and control of the forces involved, and of the grand strategy which governs them. Third, it can go into effect forthwith, an important consideration since General de Gaulle may well move very rapidly in his attempts to break the NATO system. There is evidence that he and his officials have been more disturbed by the British decision over Bomber Command than by any other action or statement of the past month. The disadvantage of the concept, in American political terms, is that it does not immediately elicit any fresh financial contribution from the European allies, and that in the eyes of the NATO military it merely regroups rather than augments nuclear striking power in Europe.

The British initiative – delayed by service and political opposition – has unfortunately come too late to hold out any hope of persuading France to divert the *force de frappe* of *Mirage IVs* from an independent strategic to a NATO interdiction role: so has the American. The question of which approach deserves the greater support must turn to a considerable extent on two considerations. First, which will elicit the greatest European support, the more modest but immediate, the more imaginative but the more distant. Second, which will be the hardest for France to sabotage and easiest for her eventually to accept. The answer is not clear yet, but I would have thought that German defense policy, now that it is freed of Strauss' delusion of grandeur, would seek a greater say in NATO strategy as a whole and in particular the deployment and use of those weapons which directly affect its own front, rather than accept the dubious honor of helping to finance and man part of a seaborne force which does not belong to it. The American search for a formula by which Germany could participate in physical control of nuclear decisions by the actual manning of ships and missiles has been devised to meet a particular political situation in Bonn which may already be dissolving. Moreover, access to the highest Anglo-American councils, through a more multilateral system of strategic planning and thereby the closest possible working knowledge of the real power of the United States, should increase German immunity to any French blandishments for a separate European or Franco-German nuclear force. By the same token, France after de Gaulle may find it harder to accept the NATO system if during her absence a new NATO force, with its own tight rules of membership, had been built up without her, whereas she might be drawn back towards it earlier if her own nuclear capability clearly had a role to play within it.

Probably the wisest course is to explore both avenues concurrently. If it should prove that the real European desire is to acquire greater political control over the formulation of America's own strategy, rather than to gain physical control of a small fraction of Western retaliatory power, acquiescence might still give the US a stronger hand to play in what may now be a 10-year conflict of ambition between Washington and Paris, and more real freedom of diplomatic and political maneuver, than Washington possesses today.

Re-Examination

We quote below the first paragraph of an Associated Press wire story dated February 13:

Washington (AP) – The Administration's top specialists began today a detailed re-examination of this country's European policy in the firm belief that it will produce confirmation that the United States had been on the right track all along.

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JULES FEIFFER

FRIDAY, MARCH 1: BEGAN LAST EVENING BY GOING TO THEATRE. SAW SMASH, SATIRICAL REVUE. STRIPPED BARE ALL MY ILLUSIONS, PRETENSIONS, HYPOCRISIES. LEFT THEATRE CRYING. TERRIBLY FUNNY, REALLY.



ENDED EVENING BY GOING TO NIGHT CLUB. SAW SMASH, SATIRICAL COMEDIAN. STRIPPED BARE ALL MY PHONY DREAMS, DELUSIONS, INCONSISTENCIES. LEFT NIGHT CLUB WEEPING. QUITE AMUSING, REALLY.

STAGGERED HOME AND CRIED SELF TO SLEEP READING NEWSPAPER. READ SMASH, SATIRICAL CARTOON. STRIPPED BARE ALL MY RATIONALIZATIONS, HOSTILITIES, SELF PITY. FAINTED DEAD AWAY. DELIGHTFUL CARTOON, REALLY.

AROSE EARLY THIS A.M. AND RAN OFF TO ANALYSIS.



WE TALKED ABOUT THE WEATHER.

ONE NEEDS <u>SOME</u> ESCAPE.

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Was Sacco Guilty?

by Michael A. Musmanno

On April 15, 1920, at about three p.m., the paymaster and guard of a shoe factory were carrying two boxes containing a payroll of $15,776.51 from the company's office to its factory, through the main street of South Braintree, Massachusetts, when they were fired upon and killed by two men armed with revolvers. As the murder was committed, a car with three other men in it drew up to the spot. The murderers threw the two boxes in it, jumped in themselves and were driven away across the railroad tracks. The car was later found abandoned in some woods. On May 5 Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were charged with the murder. Their joint trial began about a year later, and on July 14, 1921, verdicts of guilty of murder in the first degree were found against each defendant.

The issue was purely one of identification, and there was a mass of conflicting evidence, 59 witnesses testifying for the Commonwealth and 99 for the defendants. The Commonwealth offered evidence against both defendants to show that they had been in South Braintree on the morning of April 15; against Sacco to show that he shot the guard, Berardelli, and was afterwards seen escaping in the car, and that a bullet removed from Berardelli's body had been fired from a pistol found on Sacco at the time of his arrest. As to Vanzetti, evidence was adduced to the effect that he was seen in the same automobile. Further, the Commonwealth alleged that the conduct of both defendants, as evinced by their carrying of firearms and the admitted lies which they told on being arrested, was evidence of "consciousness of guilt."

The New Republic, June 9, 1926

Were Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti guilty of the murders for which they were executed on August 22, 1927? Most of the literature published on the subject since 1927 has argued their innocence, but in *Tragedy in Dedham*, Francis Russell, who at one time passionately believed in the innocence of both, concludes that Sacco was guilty. He changed his mind for several reasons, the most important being a test made of Sacco's pistol in October, 1961 – 41 years after the South Braintree crime. When he was arrested, Sacco had on his person a 32 caliber Colt pistol which he used in his capacity as night watchman at the shoe factory where he was employed in Stoughton, Massachusetts. A bullet extracted from the body of Alessandro Berardelli, payroll guard, who, together with Frederick Parmenter, paymaster, was killed on April 15, 1920 in South Braintree, Massachusetts, was of 32 caliber and ascertained to have been fired through a Colt pistol.

Tragedy in Dedham
by Francis Russell
(McGraw-Hill; $6.95)

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts claimed that Sacco's pistol fired the Berardelli bullet. Sacco denied it, asserting that he was in Boston at the time of the murders. Eleven witnesses testified to that alibi. The Commonwealth did not call one witness to refute the evidence of the eleven alibi witnesses.

At the trial in 1921 two defense firearms experts testified that in their opinion the Berardelli bullet had not been fired through Sacco's pistol.

The Commonwealth also produced two experts. One of them, Charles Van Amburgh, testified that he was "inclined to believe" the Berardelli bullet was fired through Sacco's pistol. In 1924, Van Amburgh was repudiated as a reliable firearms expert by Homer S. Cummings, State's Attorney in Connecticut and later Attorney General of the United States. Van Amburgh, after making various tests with a pistol owned by one Harold Israel, declared categorically that Israel's pistol had fired the shot which killed the victim in a murder in Bridgeport. Cummings turned over the pistol to five experts from the Remington Company and another from the New York Police Department. They unanimously disagreed with Van Amburgh's conclusions and found that Israel's pistol could not have fired the fatal shot in the case. Israel was freed of the charge of murder.

The other Commonwealth firearms expert in the Sacco-Vanzetti case was William Proctor, Captain of the Massachusetts State Police. When asked whether the Berardelli bullet had passed through Sacco's pistol, he answered: "My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired by that pistol." In other words, the bullet went through a Colt 32, and since Sacco's pistol was of that make and caliber, it *could* have passed through that weapon. It could also have passed through 299,999 other Colt 32's in existence at the time.

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Later, on October 23, 1923, Captain Proctor, in a sworn statement, declared that he did not intend by the answer he gave at the trial "to imply that I had found any evidence that the so-called mortal bullet had passed through this particular Colt automatic pistol." He said further that he found *no evidence* that the mortal bullet had passed through Sacco's pistol.

In June, 1927, another "expert," Calvin H. Goddard, asserted that Sacco's pistol had fired the Berardelli bullet. Commenting on Goddard's test, Francis Russell says in his book that it was Goddard's conclusion "that the mortal bullet taken from Berardelli's body had been fired through Sacco's pistol and could have been fired through no other."

Did Goddard possess that infallibility of skill and judgment which would justify the unwavering conclusion that Sacco's pistol and "no other" fired the fatal bullet? Consider Goddard's conduct in a Cleveland murder case several months later. A man called Frank Milazzo was charged with shooting Ernest Yorkell to death. Milazzo claimed he was innocent. Goddard tested the revolver, which was found in the accused's possession when arrested, and said it was Milazzo's revolver which fired the bullet. It was conclusively established later, however, that Milazzo's revolver could not have killed Yorkell for the simple reason that Milazzo did not come into possession of that revolver until *after* Yorkell was killed. The Cleveland police released Milazzo.

Now, Russell produces two experts of his own – Jac Weller and Frank Jury. They fired a test bullet through the ancient Sacco pistol and compared it with the ancient Berardelli bullet and, in the words of Russell, "determined beyond dispute" that the Berardelli bullet had passed through Sacco's pistol.

A firearms test can obviously be no more reliable than the persons who conduct it. The irreducible essentials are: impartiality, scientific skill, and untampered materials with which to work. Did Jac Weller and Frank Jury qualify under these three standards?

In 1957, before Jac Weller or Frank Jury even saw Sacco's pistol or the Berardelli bullet, in a book entitled *Firearms Investigation Identification and Evidence*, they approved the following statement: "There can be no doubt that Sacco's pistol fired one cartridge case and one of the fatal bullets." With this declared predetermined conclusion of Sacco's guilt, do Weller and Jury qualify as impartial?

Taking up the second criterion for reliability of firearms experts, one must look into the scientific background of these two men. After reading Russell's book I made inquiries. I found, to my surprise, that Frank Jury had been employed at one time in my home city of Pittsburgh as an expert in the local crime laboratory. By examining records and speaking with officials in the Pittsburgh Police Department and the District Attorney's office, I learned that Frank Jury had admitted, over his own signature, that he had made a crucial mistake in testing a revolver supposedly involved in a murder. Briefly the facts are these:

In June, 1954, Earl R. Saunders was tried in the Allegheny County courts for murder; he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for having shot John Neelans to death. The murder weapon was not located. Three years later, Franklin D. Wright was accused of armed robbery. He had in his possession a 32 caliber Iver-Johnson revolver. Frank Jury fired test bullets through this revolver and compared them with the bullet which had been taken from the body of the deceased John Neelans. He stated conclusively and officially that the Wright revolver had fired the fatal Neelans bullet. Saunders' lawyer began legal proceedings to have his client released from the penitentiary. The Pittsburgh Police Department conducted an intense search into the history of the Wright revolver and found that it could not have been used in the Neelans murder because it was in the hands of a person legally entitled to possess it (other than Saunders or Wright) at the time of the murder. In addition, the Pennsylvania State Police conducted tests in their ballistics laboratory at Harrisburg and discovered that test bullets fired through the Wright revolver did not resemble any of the markings on the Neelans fatal bullet *"even in general characteristics."* Frank Jury now conducted another test with the Wright revolver and acknowledged that his first conclusion was incorrect. He specifically stated that "the evidence bullet [the Neelans fatal bullet] could not have been fired in Item 1 [the Wright revolver]."

If Frank Jury could make so colossal a blunder in testing a firearm only three years after the shooting, what were his chances for absolute accuracy in testing a firearm *41 years after* the shooting in South Braintree?

Who is Jac Weller, the other man Russell employed to test the Sacco pistol? Russell merely identifies him as the "honorary curator of the West Point Museum." There is no doubt that Jac Weller is regarded as a firearms expert, but he does not devote the attention and time to firearms which one would expect in an infallible firearms expert. I use the word "infallible" justifiably, because Russell maintains that it is

Some Say In Ice

The winter solstice of the world has come,
And comes the final night. Cold, cold
The neighborhoods of earth and air are dumb,
And the heavy ocean thickens and grows old.

Green hearts of seeds are stilled: fire dies:
Blood creeps: clocks stop: no rivers flow.
The red sun shrinks: O shut your eyes
Against the blind, white staring of the snow!

What haggard Christ, blood frozen on his lips,
Has come, and comes what fearful Providence?
The waked souls shiver in the hand that strips
Them bare to Heaven's alien radiance.

DUNCAN C. CLARK

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utterly impossible for Jac Weller and Frank Jury to have been other than scientifically infallible in their 1961 test. Besides being a "leading gun expert" and watching over a museum, how does Weller occupy his time? Robert F. Mooney, administrator of the Borough of Princeton, New Jersey, Weller's home town, answered an inquiry about Jac Weller by stating that "Since his graduation from Princeton, he [Weller] has been in the real estate and insurance business here in town."

Even if Jac Weller and Frank Jury could qualify as the greatest firearms experts in the United States (which they could not – by many furlongs) the test they conducted in 1961 still proved nothing which would be acceptable in a court of law.

If the test of a firearm is to have any meaning whatever, the weapon must be in the same condition, when tested, as it was when the criminal shooting occurred. The bullet involved in the criminal shooting, when later compared with a test bullet, must also be in the same condition as it was when fired into a human body. How do the Sacco pistol and the Berardelli bullet fare under these absolutely minimum standards of proof?

In 1927 the Sacco pistol and the Berardelli bullet disappeared from the custody of the Massachusetts State Police. Russell painstakingly related the tedious efforts he made in trying to locate the Sacco-Vanzetti exhibits. No one seemed to know what had happened to them. Finally, they turned up in the home of Charles Van Amburgh, son of the Van Amburgh who had testified at the Sacco-Vanzetti trial. The elder Van Amburgh had taken them home as personal relics. Russell says that when he found the exhibits "they were *relatively* free from corrosion, although the clips that fastened them in their triple envelopes had *rusted* into the paper." He says also that "*apparently* they (the exhibits) had not been disturbed since 1927." (All italics are mine.) By use of the modifying words "relatively" and "apparently" Russell reveals his inability to appreciate the absolute necessity of undeviating precision when dealing with the testing of firearms and bullets. The markings by which experts ascertain whether bullets match or not, sometimes are as infinitestimal as one-half of a thousandth inch (.0005).

What happened to Sacco's pistol in 41 years? As early as 1923, the barrel of Sacco's pistol had become "fouled" and "rusty," Russell admits. What, then, was its condition 38 years later?

Russell tells how, when Jac Weller and Frank Jury tested the Sacco pistol in 1961, its barrel was so incrusted with rust that the test could not be conducted without first cleansing the barrel of rust. How was the cleansing done? The two experts fired two shots through the pistol to "clear the rust from the barrel." By doing this, they blasted away all scientific similarity between the Sacco pistol of 1920 and the Sacco pistol of 1961; in shooting out the rust they altered the lining of the barrel to such an extent that it could not, after that, be regarded infallibly, as the barrel of 41 years before.

What was the condition of the Berardelli bullet? It also had rusted. Almost naïvely, Russell says that the bullet was washed before the testing. He does not state in what it was washed. Soap and water would not remove rust. If it was washed in acid, this could affect the constituency of the metal.

I called on Charles Van Amburgh, Jr., who had had the custody of the rusting exhibits between the time they had disappeared from the official State depository and the time Russell found them. I asked him whether a test made in 1961 would be reliable. He authorized me to write that although he had not changed his views regarding what had been established in the courts, it was his belief that "one is on dangerous ground to assert that a test made 41 years after the original firing can be regarded as infallible. Such a test could lead to confusion. Any metallic object such as a lead slug is bound to oxidize, corrode and deteriorate."

The crowning nonsense of Russell's assertion of the infallibility of the Weller-Jury test is that the test was conducted without any court or official supervision and without the presence of any established impartial expert to check on accuracy. The Weller-Jury test, if presented in court, would be ruled out with a possible stern reproval from the presiding judge as a ludicrous attempt to submit *ex parte* guesswork as reliable evidence in so solemn a matter as a murder case. This is not, to

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quote Mr. Justice Holmes, "a matter for police presumptions; we must look *facts in the face.*"

Russell relates that when the Sacco-Vanzetti exhibits were returned to the Massachusetts State Ballistics Laboratory, after their mysterious oxidizing odyssey, Lieutenant John Collins exploded: "The way they handled these exhibits from the beginning makes my hair stand on end . . . *I don't know whether you could prove anything with them now or not.* I wouldn't touch them myself."

Russell, who is no firearms expert, touched them, fingered them, laundered the bullet, thrust the Sacco pistol in his belt, and from all these grotesque happenings, arrived at his grotesque conclusions.

How dependable, generally, is Russell's account? He states, for instance, that Judge Thayer, who presided over the Sacco-Vanzetti trial, and Frederick Katzmann, the district attorney who prosecuted the case, "believed to their dying day that Sacco and Vanzetti were guilty." How could Russell possibly know what Thayer and Katzmann had in their heads on their deathbeds? Obviously, Thayer and Katzmann were not going to assert, after Sacco and Vanzetti had been executed, that they believed the doomed men to have been innocent. I talked to both Thayer and Katzmann. There was nothing in their demeanor or language which suggested they were at ease with their conscience for what they had done in the Sacco-Vanzetti case.

Russell says that "all South Braintree where the murders occurred still firmly believes that Sacco and Vanzetti were guilty." How can he possibly know this? He did not question the 5,600 people in South Braintree as to how they felt, even assuming that some 40 years after the crime, *all* knew about the details of the crime. He says that after Sacco and Vanzetti had been sentenced, "nine out of ten of the city's lawyers were agreed that when the courts had spoken, contrary voices should be mute." How does he know this? Did he interrogate all the lawyers of Boston?

Since he was only 10 years old when the murders occurred, Russell, of course, has no personal knowledge of the facts. He necessarily has had to write from hearsay. Unfortunately, much of the hearsay rests on other hearsay which, in turn, has for its base still more hearsay. For instance, he says that "Sacco is *said* to have confessed to one of his lawyers, and Jerry McAnarney is *said* just before his death to have *told* a friend they were guilty." *Who* said that Sacco confessed to one of his lawyers, *who* said what McAnarney said before his death, and *who* said that McAnarney told a friend, and *who* was that friend? We aren't told.

Russell writes that Carlo Tresca, a New York anarchist, told Max Eastman, who told Francis Russell, that Sacco was guilty. A hearsay which is the first link of a paper chain of hearsays must bear some resemblance to verisimilitude if it is not to tear apart at the first tug. I saw Carlo Tresca and talked to him a number of times; he never professed to know personally anything about the facts. Certainly he was no witness. Nor was he particularly close to Sacco or Vanzetti. In all the collected letters of Sacco and Vanzetti, there is none to Tresca.

Russell never saw Carlo Tresca yet he pictures him as a Diogenes of truth. He says, again from hearsay, "No one, not even the police who arrested him [Tresca] – and he had been arrested 36 times – questioned his integrity." This statement can only be regarded as a flight of fancy. Russell did not question *everyone* who talked to Tresca and obviously he did not question the policemen who arrested Tresca 36 times. If he had talked to these policemen, he might have found they believed Tresca to be a murderer, a seditionist, a peace-disturber, an inciter of riots, and a con-

The Ripeness of Winter

There comes a day when the snowbanks
go gray and soft, and the sun
is warm like the earliest light
in an April dawn. The drift shadows
turn dim from the glacial blue
of winter mornings,
and the whiteness of the fields
fades beneath the shadows
of a ragged cloud of birds.

Now the windows of the house
are raised grating against their frames
to let the sweet wind stir in the curtains.
Let us admit: the cold is such
that in November we would be surprised
at open windows – would close the house
and turn inward toward an open fire,
thumbing old books and blessing
all the sealed corners which nail in
warmth and the very breath we breathe.

But there is an over-ripeness here,
of winter and our mood. This house
has been itself too long; today
our hearts awake like cold flowers
that turn in silence toward the sun.

Open the windows, let the air wash
oldness from these rooms and halls.
The light now blows like robins on the snow;
the clouds of morning build a range of hills
with the shadows of rain; the breeze
is numb with warmth and smells of sun.

JACK MATTHEWS

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spirator. I do not say the police would have been correct in all these assumptions, but at least in one case the police proved Tresca to have been dishonest. He was charged with criminal obscenity, was convicted, and served one year in the Atlanta penitentiary for that crime.

Russell then wheels into his case for the prosecution a statement (again hearsay) made by Fred Moore (Sacco's defense counsel at the trial) to Upton Sinclair. Moore told Sinclair that he believed that Sacco was guilty. Moore, of course, even though an attorney, had no personal knowledge of the crime. Moreover, he admitted to Mr. Sinclair that Sacco never suggested to him in any way that he was guilty. Nor did Sacco's friends suggest to Moore that Sacco was guilty. Moore's outburst to Upton Sinclair could well have been inspired by the bitterness he felt against Sacco who had dismissed him as his attorney. At least so Moore's wife declared.

Russell makes much of the Moore episode and builds on the name of Upton Sinclair. I talked to Upton Sinclair in Monrovia, California about Russell's reference to him in *Tragedy in Dedham*. "Those who believe or declare Sacco was guilty get no support from me," Sinclair said. Later he confirmed this statement in writing. He added: "I have not altered my views from those expressed in *Boston*. I stand with Elizabeth Thornwell Alvin who said: 'I have tried with all my might to picture Bart and Nick committing such a crime, and I cannot do it – the idea is preposterous and unthinkable. And this much I really do know – this I would die for – they never were proved guilty for their trials were a shameful and wicked farce."

I went to see other people Russell quotes in his book. I talked to Aldino Felicani, who headed the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee. He told me that Russell garbled statements made by him. Tom O'Connor, who probably knows the origin of the Sacco-Vanzetti case better than anyone still living, has repudiated Russell's reliability.

When Russell started to write his book he told O'Connor that he would dedicate the book to him with the words: "who uncovered how it all started." O'Connor put authenticated documents at Russell's disposal and gave him many hours of his time. Russell distorted so many essential facts that O'Connor repulsed the proposed dedication and publicly stated: "Even if Russell had ended up with a conclusion completely satisfactory to me, I would have been embarrassed at any dedication to me, since there are so many errors, so much malicious innuendo in his book, apart from his fantastically wrong conclusions."

Russell likewise misrepresented the Rev. Roland D. Sawyer, who served 27 years in the Massachusetts Legislature. In 1927, Sawyer introduced a resolution to have a special legislatively supervised commission review the entire case. Sawyer protested to Russell certain misrepresentations in the book and took him to task for not having checked with him on facts which were particularly within his (Sawyer's) knowledge.

Robert H. Montgomery, a Boston lawyer, who himself has written a book on the case, informed me that Russell misquoted him and misrepresented him.

Russell devotes considerable space to Michael E. Stewart, the Chief of Police of Bridgewater who was responsible for the arrest of Sacco and Vanzetti in the first instance and was closely connected with the prosecution from the time of their arrest until their execution.

I called on Mr. Stewart last summer, together with Clement A. Norton, a well-known Boston lawyer, one time chairman of the Boston School Committee and a long-time acquaintance of Mr. Stewart. Mr. Norton and I were both appalled by what we heard. Stewart began by saying: "Russell imagines he knows everything about the Sacco-Vanzetti case, but as a matter of fact he doesn't know it at all."

I then said to Mr. Stewart that Russell had written a great deal about him in *Tragedy in Dedham*, and asked him if the author had got his material from him (Stewart). Stewart replied: "No, he didn't get anything from me. I never saw him."

I asked: "Do I understand that he did not come here and talk with you?"

"He never came here, and I didn't talk to him anywhere else."

I said: "I thought from reading his book that he came to see you, just as I have, and that he sat here, with a notebook and pencil, just as I am sitting here with notebook and pen."

"No, he never came here and I didn't give him any material for his book."

I said: "Mr. Russell even tells in his book what you were thinking."

Mr. Stewart said: "That shows just how unreliable he is. How could he tell what I was thinking, especially when he didn't even see me?"

I prepared a memorandum of my interview with Michael E. Stewart, including the conversation I have just quoted, and sent a copy of it, with an accompanying letter, to Mr. Stewart. Later, I sent a second letter informing him that I intended to quote from the memorandum. He indicated in no way that he did not approve of the accuracy of my memorandum.

Either Francis Russell or Michael Stewart is in error as to what occurred. There is no room for reconciliation between their conflicting accounts. If Russell did not see Stewart, his book is suspect. If he did see Stewart and correctly reported what Stewart told him, his book loses credibility because, without Michael E. Stewart, there probably


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would have been no Sacco-Vanzetti case. It was Stewart who set the trap which accidentally shut on Sacco and Vanzetti. If he was capable of telling Mr. Norton and myself that he never talked to Francis Russell (and our conversation lasted for about an hour and a half) but in fact talked to him, the dependability of what he told Russell and what Russell wrote in his book falls to the ground. It destroys the prosecution's explanation of the origin of the case, and without that, there is no case.

If Russell insists Stewart *did* talk to him, Russell must at the same time repudiate what Stewart told him and which he put into the book. *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.*

It would be no answer for Russell to say that Stewart is old and may have forgotten. Stewart was practically the same age when Russell says he talked to him and Russell then accepted what Stewart said and made it one of the pillars of proof in his book. Stewart gave every appearance of a man in excellent health, and Mr. Norton bears me out in this. On the rock of Stewart, Russell's book founders irretrievably.

Fiction, Society and History

by Alexander Welsh

The historical "moment" for Georg Lukács – and for modern Hungary – has not yet arrived. Twice Lukács came forward to serve in public office in Hungary: both regimes proved to be among the most abortive of the century, and both came down in blood. Lukács first became minister of culture in the short-lived regime of Bela Kun in 1919. The second time was in October, 1956. He resigned as the Red Army closed in on Budapest. Whether through the efforts of friends or because of the sheer weight of his intellectual reputation, Lukács did not suffer the fate of his superior, Imre Nagy. He was exiled to Rumania, and has now returned to Hungary, where he is reportedly still active in spite of his seventy-eight years and restrictions on his right to teach and to publish.

The Historical Novel
by Georg Lukács
translated by
Hannah and Stanley Mitchell
introduction by Irving Howe
(Beacon; $2.45)

Though Georg Lukács is one of the great Marxist theorists and probably the greatest Marxist critic of literature, he is almost unknown in this country, and only slightly less so in Great Britain. Only two of his books have been translated into English – and in German he makes very tough reading. The first was his *Studies in European Realism* (1950). The second, *The Historical Novel*, was first published in 1937 in Moscow, where Lukács lived in exile after Berlin was closed to him in 1933. The abstract, Hegelian style of Lukács still makes difficult reading, even in translation; but *The Historical Novel* is unquestionably a great critical work, and will shake the complacency of American and British critics toward the great novelists of the first half of the 19th Century.

Lukács is much more than a Marxist. (Paradoxically, that may be one reason he has survived so many divisive Communist struggles.) Though he quotes liberally – often with surprising relevance – from Marx and Lenin, the real inspiration of his thought is in Goethe and Hegel, the German classical philosophers in general, and a wide spectrum of 19th Century criticism on the Continent. His heroes in the novel are Scott, Balzac, and Tolstoi. And the optimism of his program is extraordinarily conservative, advocating "the struggle to renew and fruitfully extend the traditions of the great progressive periods of mankind, the spirit of revolutionary democracy, the artistic grandeur and popular strength of the classical historical novel."

Three things distinguish Lukács from the majority of American and British critics: his far-ranging comparative approach to literature; his passionate conviction that literature is an inseparable part of life and of history; and his concern with historicism – the modern awareness of the present as history that begins about the time of the French Revolution. His strong and comprehensive position obviously has its shortcomings. His assumption throughout is that "society is the principal subject of the novel," and, when this assumption becomes historically untrue, toward the end of the 19th Century, his analysis falters. Except as an unhealthy expression of social decadence, Lukács is not interested in the psychological novel. Occasionally his lip-service to Communist doctrine may make the reader grimace. Lukács' preferences and even his understanding are dictated by his own dialectical view. But his brilliant qualifications, his circling, hovering patience with the contradictions of history, his contempt for "mechanistic fatalism," his belief that history is made through chance and human decision, and that art is always an individual and unique expression, add up to a work that is somehow both ponderous and breathtaking.

Thus a Marxist has become the most enthusiastic and convincing admirer of Sir Walter Scott in modern times. For Lukács returns again and again to the novels of Scott. He no doubt exaggerates Scott's achievement; and I think he is fundamentally wrong about the meaning of the Waverley Novels. But Lukács is chiefly concerned with the significance of Scott for later writers, with his relation to Cooper, Pushkin, Manzoni, to Balzac, and indirectly to Tolstoi. In numerous asides he acknowledges that Scott was not fully conscious of what he was achieving, that his Tory politics are irrelevant. The obvious difficulties with Scott's values and intentions are resolved in any case by the "contradictory character of progress" – in the same sense that capitalism was necessary to Communism.

Lukács tackles exactly the right problem with Scott – his position in the history of the novel. In histories of English fiction the Waverley Novels are an awkward limb – critics cannot decide whether to cut it off or twist it back into place. If we are content to discuss what fiction is most "like" Scott, we come up with the subliterature of Harrison Ainsworth or G. P. R. James – or, at best, Robert Louis Steven-

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son. Because Lukács disdains "philological influence" (the science of who copied whom) and because he is convinced that the historical novel, except in its decadent forms, is not a separate genre at all, he is able to arrive at a consistent and historically continuous estimate of Scott's achievement. The classical form of the historical novel "arises out of the great social novel and then, enriched by a conscious historical attitude, flows back into the latter. On the one hand, the development of the social novel first makes possible the historical novel; on the other, the historical novel transforms the social novel into a genuine history of the present."

To establish this continuity Lukács concentrates on the peculiar "middle-of-the-road" hero of Scott. This unheroic young gentleman takes the center of the stage because in literature, as in life, the true heroes, the "world-historical individuals," appear only sporadically in critical moments. The opposite is appropriate in historical drama, where the "world-historical individual" monopolizes the stage. The analysis of this principle controls Lukács's chapter on the relation of fiction and drama – the highly interesting theoretical center of his book. The principle can be illustrated by this quotation from Otto Ludwig: "If one were to think of *Lear* as a novel, then Edgar would probably have to be the hero. . . . If, on the other hand, one wanted to turn *Rob Roy* into a drama, then Rob Roy himself would have to be the hero, but the story itself would have to be considerably changed. Francis Osbaldistone would have to be omitted entirely." I do not agree that Scott's gentlemen heroes are created solely by the logical exigencies of turning history into fiction: they are passive and unheroic because they represent a passive and distinctly British ideal. But with respect to Scott's significance for European realism, Lukács' argument is compelling. It enables him to draw what is undoubtedly a genuine relation between Edward Waverley or Henry Morton and Tolstoi's Kutuzov. Similarly, most English and American readers will find fault with Lukács' words about Shakespeare: but his analysis of why and how the historical drama precedes the historical novel is important.

It may be added that there is another way of linking Scott with subsequent fiction of which students of American literature are increasingly aware and Lukács is not. I mean the respect in which the Waverley Novels were "romance" – the kind of fiction that is frankly make-believe, bordering on dream or fantasy, and having its own ideal purposes. Hawthorne, Melville, and James were conscious of romance as a distinct kind of fiction. But also in Great Britain novelists were taken up by the problem of imitating or contradicting the constructions of romance. "In *Bleak House*," wrote Dickens, "I have purposely dwelt upon the romantic side of familiar things"; Thackeray and George Eliot consciously subverted the romance of Scott.

What kind of ideals does Lukács ultimately respect? What kinds of heroism? There is a solid, old-fashioned side to his "democratic humanism." His taste in literature may even expose him to the charge of bourgeois sentimentality. He is interested not merely in history and the dialectical progress toward Communism, but in "the spiritual uprise of a Jeanie Deans in Scott or the unshakeable constancy of Lorenzo and Lucia in Manzoni." His attitude toward "the people" is not so very different from Scott's. No more than Scott is Lukács an actual member of the proletariat; both feel close to the people from a distance – though with vastly different intentions. Lukács believes that Scott "has a deeper, more genuine and differentiated sense of historical necessity than any writer before him." When he says this we think also of Burke, and our sense of the origins of Marxist thought is considerably shaken. The classical economists are not the only thinkers transformed by the powerful dialectic; the belief in historical necessity has its impressive conservative origins.

Lukács' analysis of "the crisis of bourgeois realism" after 1848 describes the false use of history as an irrelevant escape from the present, and the penchant of the later historical novel for the exotic and the brutal. His attack on naturalism is primarily logical – "any reflection of objective reality is necessarily relative." His condemnation of violence for its own sake, psychological abnormality in fiction, and so forth may call to mind the steady puritanism of the Communist faith, but is hardly objectionable on that ground. Because Lukács is not interested in the varieties of the modern novel that command respect in the West, his American readers may feel that even if his hopes for a rebirth of the classical historical novel could be fulfilled, the resulting "negation of a negation" would be some pretty dull novels. Lukács' hope, of course, is for a great *affirmative* fiction, celebrating man and society.

The last third of *The Historical Novel* becomes less and less interesting. This is not only because of Lukács' incessant nostalgia for the bourgeois giants and the impossibility of his hopes, but because the Marxist interpretation of history itself grows less and less valid after 1848. *The Historical Novel* was written twenty-five years ago; in his preface to the English edition Lukács concedes that his optimism was unwarranted. History has made


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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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passages in this book almost painful to read: "We are in the midst of a heroic period, whose heroism moreover does not rest on historically necessary illusions, as was the case with the Puritans in the English and the Jacobins in the French Revolution, but upon a real knowledge of the needs of the working people and the direction in which society is developing. This heroism does not rest on illusions because its historical conditions are not so constituted that a period of prosaic disenchantment must follow upon its victory."

How many disenchantments has Georg Lukács suffered since he wrote these words in exile in 1927? *The Historical Novel* is a monument to the things he has valued most – man and history. The book promises the stamina of the mind under the incredible frustrations of a totalitarian regime in flux, and testifies to the extraordinary patience of one man's faith in history.

FILMS

Joseph K. and Orson W.

Orson Welles' new, keenly awaited film is "based on" Kafka's *The Trial*, and the first point to consider is the phrase "based on." In film-making there are no absolutes about fidelity to originals, but the better the source is – one might even say the better-known it is – the more specific the expectations are in the audience. Welles has adapted Kafka freely. But we mustn't

The Trial (Astor)

be rigidly literary; he is a film-maker. Two questions are pertinent. Has his picture achieved, through its medium, the same substantive effect as the novel? Or, if not (and this is a big concession when the adaptation is from a work of high stature), has it achieved a cogent effect of its own?

Before we proceed to the film's stunning virtues, let us avoid trifling suspense and answer both questions in the negative. Kafka's novel, in briefest essence, is an allegory of a man who, representing all that is pathetic in our society, accepts imputed guilt without being clearly accused and eventually accepts punishment by death. Welles' Joseph K. refuses to knuckle under, accuses his accusers of trying to make the world absurd; he not only resists execution, he kills his executioners and is in fact laughing triumphantly at the end. So much for Kafka. But the final flaw is not that the ending has been altered and the theme shunted off but that nothing has really been substituted for it. Welles has no alternative theme. He has simply taken materials that move in a certain direction and, at the last moment, has switched directions. This is not adaptation to the film form, it is temporization. It looks like nothing more than the way Hollywood would "lick" a difficult book.

There are other alterations that cannot be seen as true adaptation, only as pandering and tinsel decoration. Everything sexual in the book is heavily amplified and a good deal is added. Miss Burstner, K.'s typist neighbor, is made a dancer-tart who lounges around in her slip with K. The wife of the court attendant kisses and bites him. His cousin's age is reduced from 18 to 15-and-a-half, and suspicions (false) about K. and her are voiced. Even Leni, the advocate's maid-mistress who is the most sexual figure in the novel, is made more sexual, is shown in her slip and with plenty of rubbings and rollings – to such a degree that her encounters with K. become events in themselves rather than a counterpoint to the theme. These injections of Dolce-Vitamins might be explained by Welles on the ground that we do not live in the 1914 of the novel's composition, that K.'s subconscious today would contain franker images, but it is curious that the sexual images are virtually the only thematic ones to be "updated." There is no reflection of other post-1914 events – the concentration camp, slave-labor camp, nuclear bomb – in connection with other elements in the story: the oppressive authority, the circular, glossy justice, the insinuating despair. No, only the sex is modernized. Thus it seems egregious show-biz – the providing of luscious roles for Jeanne Moreau, Elsa Martinelli, and Romy Schneider.

Welles himself narrates the priest's tale of the man and the gatekeeper at the very beginning, to the accompaniment of a series of drawings. (Then, as the film itself begins, he tells us that the novel is said to have the logic of a dream – perhaps the most helpful remark since Olivier introduced his *Hamlet* as the tragedy of a man who could not make up his mind.) This transposition completely vitiates the cathedral scene when it comes; it leaves the priest with nothing to do and robs the pilgrim of progress. Other scenes – an inserted episode with Miss Burstner's lame friend dragging a trunk, Akim Tamiroff's mouthings as Block, the advocate's client-lodger – go on long past their usefulness. Locutions like "oh, brother," "all that jazz," "joy-boy," clash with the European look of the film. The painter Titorelli is, for no apparent reason, tinged with effeminacy. The last scene omits what is possibly the single most poignant and symbolically important touch in the novel: the figure that appears at the distant window, arms stretched toward K. as he lies waiting under the knife.

These and other alterations, insertions, dilations, weaken the film's unity and growth. Any depth it might have achieved in spite of them, any richness of spiritual exploration, is quashed by the casting of Anthony Perkins as K. Welles is notorious for his dubious casting: Tim Holt (*Magnificent Ambersons*), Jeannette Nolan (*Macbeth*), Robert Arden (*Mr. Arkadin*). It seems a persistent egotism that he can make silk out of shoddy. Perkins is his worst error to date, and as with the upbeat ending, commercial considerations must be suspected. Not that Perkins gives – for him – a bad performance, but an even better one by him would still be out of place. Through this film peopled with strong-featured Europeans in markedly European clothes, Perkins moves in his Ivy League suits with his Ivy League face. His bashful Yankee-boy *persona* is ludicrously in-

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appropriate as protagonist of this conflict of humanism with temporal and divine authority – a conflict seen in terms of *Mittel-Europa* through a Jewish consciousness.

What does Welles give us, then? A number of scenes that are in themselves so brilliantly imagined, so dexterously composed, so dynamically impelled that they almost attain an aesthetic of their own, as a poem may be beautiful in diction though muddy in meaning. (Like much of Dylan Thomas.) The swift weaving motion of the opening scene which in itself seems to hypnotize K.; the editing of the flogging scene; the bursting from the empty corridor into the jam-packed courtroom and the use of the huge mob like a chorus-ballet; the billowing ocean of bundled legal books and papers; the glass-panelled corridors like baroque prisons; the prying, restless, surging camera that seems at times to push Joseph K. along – the over-all quality of an eye impatient with anything but its own piercing insight, of an energy that takes a scene and breaks it open like a nut to show us what is in it – all these and more are evidences of a superb, powerful talent. The fine sets by Jean Mandaroux are real-unreal (the rivet-studded girders recur in court and cathedral and advocate's house); the lighting – often long and horizontal – and the photography of Edmond Richard take most of the subjects by interesting surprise. Used knowingly by Welles, these elements help to give this film the feeling of the first-rate.

But it is not: because it lacks integral design and accomplishment, Kafka's or anyone else's. Welles stands where he stood, a spoiled big-baby prodigy who cannot resist showing off and who would be unbearable except that his showing off is often so magnificent. Part of his mistake is in selecting serious material; his worst previous films were *Macbeth* and *Othello*. He needs lesser material with which to work so that his ego has no sizable competition, for he is not capable of dedicating himself to an author, he just wants chances for virtuosity. The effect here is like turning Joan Sutherland loose in *Wozzeck* and telling her to improvise.

Everyone interested in films has had high hopes for *The Trial*. In the 22 years since *Citizen Kane*, Welles had completed only eight films and none of them, it is said, was released exactly as he wished. This picture was talked of as his renascence. But it shows that he lacks the controlling artistic intelligence of an Antonioni or Kurosawa. Which means, ineluctably, that he has no view of life that he wants deeply to state, no poetic vision to convey, no relation with his world of which his films are an expression. He is a scene and sequence maker, not a film-maker.

Our age believes in a new phenomenon: talent in the abstract, talent independent of works. Norman Mailer and Edward Albee, for examples, are considered first-rate writers by many, although few would claim that they have as yet written first-rate works. Welles differs in that he has created at least one work (*Kane*) unassailably of the first rank. But since then Welles has been – and for the time being he remains – among those who would be masters if only they would make masterpieces. Stanley Kauffmann

TELEVISION

A Few Questions to Mr. Minow

Here is an important and puzzling statement of Mr. Minow's TV policy for the next ten years, delivered to the Fund for the Republic on January 22. The chairman of the FCC asks for "stern, critical, and searching examination of it"; I shall do the best I can. In my opinion, if his proposals are weighted correctly in practice, they could rescue us from the present morass; if they are weighted incorrectly, they will make little difference (though I do not think we would be worse off).

His premise is the new law enacted in 1962 which has permitted the Commission to rule that TV sets manufactured after April 30, 1964 can only be shipped interstate if they are capable of receiving 82, as against 12 channels. The number of channels available to the listener in any given area will, of course, be far less than 82 (the absolute maximum would be between 15-20). It is estimated that, at normal replacement, all sets will be all-channel within eight years. This will allow for 1900 commercial stations (at present there are less than 550). And the stated policy is that these resources are to be available "to as many commercial and non-commercial broadcasters in as many communities and areas as is technically possible. . . . We have sought to encourage many diverse sources of programs. . . . The widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public. . . . We have hoped for the maximum number of local stations to serve as outlets for local expression. Our present policy contemplates 2,229 TV stations in about 1200 communities." He contrasts this prospect with what has happened to newspapers: "Since 1945 the daily newspaper circulation has increased from 40 million to 60 million, while the number of cities with dailies under competing ownership has decreased from 117 to 58. Forty years ago 552 cities had competing daily papers."

In brief, contrary to the prevailing tendency of our society, Mr. Minow seems resolutely dedicated to decentralizing ownership and programming. So far, I am enthusiastic. No doubt many a provincial station would be run on the political and cultural level of chimpanzees and would hanker after the national canned goods. But there is

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no other method but this multiplication of the sources of origin if we are to prevent regimentation, allow for the occasional emergence of the spontaneous and indigenous and encourage local initiative. Also, it seems to me that the free competition of ideas and entertainment with limited audiences should rapidly produce its own sophistication.

Mr. Minow then proceeds to spell out four developments that he hopes for from his policy:

"1. Lighting up 82 channels will make possible a truly nationwide educational television system through a network of stations devoted to classroom instruction during the day and to broad, cultural adult programming in the evening. . . .

"2. It will make possible nationwide pay television. In the simplest form the argument of pay television proponents is that if a minority part of the audience could pay directly for the programming it wishes, its needs could be met without detriment to the advertiser-supported TV system aiming largely at majority audiences. . . .

"3. It will make possible a fourth commercial network appealing to higher rather than lower common audience denominators. . . .

"4. Finally, more channels will make possible new stations to meet local needs. . . ."

Now the relative weight assigned to these four items seems to me to be crucial. It is clear that Mr. Minow is most concerned with "educational TV," to which he devotes a number of pages. The new entirely decentralized free stations, in which I find the most hope, seem to stir his imagination the least. But let me comment on each of the four in turn.

1. As a cultural value, educational TV, whose sources are the universities, comes at a time when by and large the university system is increasingly regimented into the national economy and power-structure; I am not convinced that a national network of the same will do much for the freedom, wisdom, beauty, or even scholarship of Americans; though it may provide some useful training and background for the complexities of modern life. And there is a valuable place for highly specialized demonstrations for scholars, professionals, and hobbyists, that may also open surprising new worlds to curious youth who happen to tune in. As a means of education, however, I am unimpressed with Educational TV. There *is* no education apart from the personal relation of teachers and students, teachers and teachers, and students and students in a community of scholars. Mr. Minow's remark that "Education is at last beginning to catch up with the communications revolution" is a philistine quip which I hope he does not mean seriously. By "devoted to classroom instruction," I assume he means that the shows are an "adjunct" to teaching; my guess is that good teachers tend to disregard such "adjuncts," as they disregard text-books, as too cumbersome and never relevant enough to the actual teaching situation, which has to do with *these* young people just where they are. On the other hand, if Mr. Minow's emphasis is on the "broad cultural programming in the evening" kind of nationwide Chautauqua, that is something that Education Channel 13 in New York does do pretty well.

2. I confess I do not clearly envisage the "minority" audiences of pay TV. Apart from horse-players or Wall Street operators, I cannot imagine any special group numerous enough or rich enough to support a public channel rather than a closed circuit; and the horse-players, etc., would have to fill up most of their hours with Muzak, the only current triumph of pay broadcasting. Is the commissioner thinking of Theater Clubs as in England, of foreign-movie fans, of Cafe Society and Playboys, of junkies? How many special groups could really use such a global service, rather than bidding for time on some of the many other stations, as happens in radio?

3. In the form he speaks of it, the proposed fourth high-level commercial network seems a disastrous conception, a combination of *Horizon, Harpers* and *Fortune* on a national scale. Yet there is meant, perhaps, a genuine and necessary idea: to have a formal high level expression of the national – and let us hope international – ideal standard, especially if there is to be considerable parochial decentralization, just as the Supreme Court raises the thinking of the country by affirming a more universal standard. If this is what he is after would it not be better to do it directly and officially, as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation does? CBC, underwritten by the Dominion, accepts ads, which make up a third of its budget. Naturally the private stations howl about the unfair competition, but there it is. Even better would be for such a national-international cultural network, representing the accepted "best" – *and keeping hands off any living art or dissenting thought* – to be run as an autonomous semi-public corporation, like the New York public libraries or many great museums. It is under such auspices that the "broad cultural adult programming," which Minow assigns to educational TV, could best be carried on, otherwise there is needless duplication. In fact, Educational TV is infiltrated with BBC programs anyway.

4. Finally, how many of the 82 channels are to be assigned, and *under what freedom of conditions*, to the strictly decentralized stations? This is the issue that determines whether TV is to become a free medium of communication.

Consider. How could NBC possibly compete and maintain its present stature against a freely decentralized system? One station would be cornier than anything NBC could wallow in; another would be sexier or more violent than it could permit; another would be more intelligent than it could think, and more artistically daring than it

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could invent. Burlesque, genuine little theater, and I. F. Stone are likely to seduce the naïve from Car 54, Perry Como or Huntley-Brinkley. Naturally the slick, the plonking, and the official would still win the plurality, but NBC would soon be reduced to the stature of *Life* and the *Saturday Evening Post*; as such we could live with it. Is this what Mr. Minow envisages?

Again, the commissioner worries himself with the following consideration: "Controversy on the air carries with it serious obligations. The law wisely requires that 'broadcasters afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views', insuring that fairness is the responsibility of the FCC." But frankly, given so many channels freely used, why is this responsibility necessary, any more than with newspapers? Would it not be better to allow each local to be characterized as strikingly as possible or as it wishes? Let us assume, as is likely, that Communists will run a station, capitalized by one of the rich people that they seem to fascinate; why not? So also for reactionary and even hate-groups, underwritten by Texas, up to the point of clear and present danger. How concretely does Minow envisage the free competition of ideas, given an abundance of outlets?

These are some of the questions that arise as one thinks of the new policy. Philosophically, the situation seems to shape up as follows: the increase of abundance and technological resources tends to work, in free conditions, toward more excitement and variety of life, undermining regimentation and top-down power. In the short run it may serve to stimulate an over-extended economy (and this is perhaps the governmental interest in it), but pretty soon, I think, it would result in more common sense and simplification. Frankly, given 82 channels fully used such throngs of people would be so busy inventing and appearing on TV shows that they would have little leisure for more profit-bearing and expensive delights. On the other hand, in the absence of imagination, new ideas, and a buoyant acceptance of the risks and advantages of conflict, these same technical advances can deaden life even further. My vague impression is that the chairman of the FCC means very well – among officers who generally do not mean anything – but that he is caught between the upper millstone of a power-hungry Administration and the nether millstone of entrenched corporations.

Paul Goodman

ART

The Image in the Round

The Whitney Museum's every-other-year show of American sculpture is less important for itself than it is for what it provokes. What it provokes is a lot of other sculpture shows, most of them far more satisfactory than the Whitney for the reason that it is easier to produce a good exhibition of works by a single artist, or a good exhibition of sculpture selected all over the lot than it is to put together an entirely pleasing show of what's going on this year, or these few years, in this country in sculpture.

Considered as a whole, the 1963 Whitney show was a howling wasteland, with no Newton Minow to threaten people into sham repentence. Sculpture was saved from the fate of painting in the fifties largely because carving and modeling are both hard work and learned skills. Even fabrication, the process most used in the Whitney, demands an essential minimum of skill and consciousness in order for the object to exist at all. Painting in that decade could safely base itself on accident. Sculpture couldn't. In sculpture an accident in the sense of destiny manifesting itself to the entranced artist invariably becomes an accident in the sense of the ladder breaking while you're mending the drain-pipe. Conservative of its nature, sculpture only now has even widely tried to look accidental. Throughout the Whitney, in wood as well as metal, unhappy accidents gave the weird impression of being in that roadside world of insurance company ads, where distraught drivers stare into the camera from the wreckage and fervently wish they'd renewed their policies.

The wasteland impression, of course, was deceptive; there was actually a great deal of inspiriting sculpture on view, most of it from expected sources: Zorach, De Creeft and Maldarelli to De Rivera, Engman, and Liberman, to Lipton and Roszak. Of all the textural "experiments" – you'd think you were in a laboratory, not a gallery – the most intriguing was the most modest: Ezio Martinelli's "Crag," which in overall

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shape resembles one of Rodin's versions of Balzac, in texture looks like a passage of funereal door-frame from a picture by Ivan Albright, and on close inspection seems to be made of 300 old beer-cans, crushed and blackened. The shape really is a crag and the surface is fascinating to read.

The most totally successful piece in motion was Len Lye's "Fountain," which should surprise no one familiar with his abstract cartoons made years ago for the British post office department. From the center of a circular base, several hundred thick steel wires or thin steel rods emerge to go up and bend from their weight. A small motor moves the whole arrangement about five degrees every three seconds, the movement being in pulses, not continuous. Each small leap forward of the base bends all the rods backward at the top; in the pause they catch up and go past the point reached by their roots. There is a continuous and varied movement of arcs upon arcs, lines against lines, shimmer against shimmer. Visually, the reference is more to wheat in the wind than to water play, but the enchantment is very close to that of a fountain. A lovely work. The experimental aspect resides less in the motor than in the very daring resort to rhythm and grace.

While the Whitney was thus revealing a few mountains among the myriad mice, other outlets could concentrate exclusively on peaks and rolling hills. By far the best of the mixed sculpture shows in New York was staged by Paul Rosenberg with American and European work of the last hundred years or so. If he's lucky, an artist occasionally creates a piece that has the rare quality of a final statement; the image endures in the minds of those who see it. It is a dozen years now since Oronzio Maldarelli created the seated figure of "Bianca," and that restrained and infinitely delicate nude dominated the Rosenberg show, which is saying a lot, because also on hand were works by Degas, Rodin, Bonnard, Moore, Matisse and Maillol, among others.

By no means outclassed in that company were two of the less well-known Rosenberg sculptors, Fred Farr and Harvey Weiss. Farr's armored, mounted warriors combine the mysterious threat we've all learned about from Japanese medieval movies with the imminent collapse we remember from the White Knight in *Through the Looking Glass*. Harvey Weiss's two pieces were both on Jewish themes. "Jericho" is more wall than city, with slabs of bronze beginning to crumble off and Joshua's troops using the relief technique in reverse: instead of emerging from the wall, they're penetrating it, a small advantage taken of means for ends. Weiss's other piece, "Ancient Synagogue #2" is a medium sized dark bronze box covered with the writing of centuries, long indecipherable. A door stands open and the inside is brilliant, lighted by a hidden source, glittering in blue and gold. Again a simple idea, meticulously carried out, conveys both the old Gentile notion of the place: mysterious, strange things hidden within, riches covered over with drabness; and the Jewish notion: "I have loved, O Lord, the beauty of thy house," set like a star in the goyish wilderness.

At the Forum Gallery, while the Whitney was on, there was an exhilerating show of bronzes by Hugo Robus, as lovely and occasionally as funny work as you'd care to see. He's been creating smooth, stylized nudes for years, including a memorable image of a woman washing her hair in one swift hyperbolic arc from shoulder blades to tresses. Here, amid such pure grace, were a bevy of water carriers with jugs for heads and a huge piece that seemed a self-deprecating tour-de-force comment on Robus' own life work; a bronze basket full of breasts and buttocks and beamishness.

World House, for this season of sculpture, gave a chapel-like installation to a major exhibition of the hammered

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Michael A. Musmanno *was a lawyer for the defense in the latter phases of the Sacco-Vanzetti case; he served as judge at the International War Crimes Trials in Nuremberg, and is now a Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.* Alexander Welsh *is on the English faculty at Yale.* Duncan C. Clark *and* Jack Matthews *are young poets who make their first* New Republic *appearances with this issue.*

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copper sheet figures of the late Saul Baizerman, one of the very few artists in any medium whose work could take such a somber, lush presentation. From the "March of the Innocents," done in the thirties, when they were really beginning to march, to a more than life-size reclining nude, face down, completed in 1957, Baizerman's work marvelously redeems the promise in all experiment. For our time, in a sense, he invented hammered copper or bronze, and in all these works the endless pounding of the hammer, the rough shaping of the metal sheets, impart a material poignancy to the high degree of spiritual poignancy in his vision. Now six years dead, he remains a man yet to be fully reckoned with.

FRANK GETLEIN

Correspondence

One Million Abortions

Sirs:

I do not know where or when I have seen a more unfair or more prejudiced statement in an American publication than the following which appeared in *One Million Abortions "It's Your Problem, Sweetheart"* by James Ridgeway (February 9):

> "One might expect a helping hand from the medical profession. Such is seldom the case. Ostensibly these doctors seek to protect their own skins from the public prosecutors. However, it seems far more probable that they abide by the AMA philosophy that modern medicine can best be practiced in the advanced circumstances of the Victorian era."

As a psychiatrist, teacher, and reseacher with one study of girls pregnant before 16 I can assert from observation at the front lines that the average physician, the huge majority of the AMA, have worried longer and deeper, have stuck their necks out further and understand more deeply the problem of unwanted pregnancy than Mr. Ridgeway could even imagine.

Is there anything more enraging than a careless, superficial but sneeringly judgmental report on a problem with which one has been deeply involved in a professional career? The writer comes in, gets a few figures, thinks up a snappy, adolescent subtitle, takes a safe shot at one of the liberals' favorite targets, talks to *one* authority, sends in his piece and forgets the problem.

Take one part of the above quotation, "seek to protect their own skins." Look, Ridgeway, do you know what prosecution for anything but strictly legal handling of this problem means? What have you done lately that took skin off your nose?

Most doctors I know do a great deal in every way possible to help the girl or woman with this problem. There are very, very few who "shunt them through the back door – to preserve its [medicine's] chaste veneer."

The article does not mention large amounts of research money spent on the physiology of fertility and reproduction and thus on birth control. I think there should be a retraction or rewriting of these parts of Mr. Ridgeway's article.

James L. Titchener, M.D.
Cincinnati, Ohio

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

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601 PAUL BEN-HAIM: "To The Chief Musician", Metamorphoses for Orchestra. WALLINGFORD RIEGGER: Variations for Violin and Orchestra, Op. 71 (Sidney Harth, Violinist).
603 LEE HOIBY: Opera: "Beatrice", Directed by Moritz Bomhard (Commissioned by WAVE Radio-TV).
604 WILLIAM SCHUMAN: *Judith,* A Choreographic Poem. GIAN-FRANCESCO MALIPIERO: Piano Concerto No. 3 (Benjamin Owen, Pianist).
605 PAUL HINDEMITH: Sinfonietta in E. CLAUDE ALMAND: John Gilbert: A Steamboat Overture. DAVID DIAMOND: Overture: "Timon of Athens".
606 BERNARD ROGERS: Dance Scenes. JOAQUIN RODRIGO: Cuatros Madrigales Amatorios: for Soprano and Orchestra (Audrey Nossaman, Soprano). VINCENT PERSICHETTI: Serenade No. 5.
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613 PETER MENNIN: Symphony No. 5. JOAQUIN RODRIGO: Concerto Galante for Violoncello and Orchestra (Grace Whitney, Cellist).
614 ALAN HOVHANESS: Magnificat for Four Solo Voices, Chorus and Orchestra, Opus 157. CHOU WEN-CHUNG: All in the Spring Wind.
615 ALEXANDER TCHEREPNIN: Piano Concerto No. 2 (Alexander Tcherepnin, Pianist). ARTHUR HONEGGER: Suite Archaique.
616 ROBERT KURKA: Symphony No. 2. ROBERT WHITNEY: Concertino.
621 CHARLES IVES: Decoration Day. LOU HARRISON: Suite for Symphonic Strings.
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